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Abstract (Français)
La théorie de la guerre juste a fournit les principes qui forment la base de nos intuitions 
concernant l’éthique de la guerre pendant plus de milles ans.  Cependant, la nature de la 
guerre a changé drastiquement dans les derniers 50 ans.  Avec les avancés 
technologiques, tous les aspects de la guerre, du champ de bataille aux armes utilisées, 
sont aujourd’hui très différents.  Ce qui est proposé dans ce texte est que les principes de 
jus in bello sont malgré tout encore adéquats pour les guerres contemporaines.  
Spécifiquement, en utilisant une analyse historique, ce texte argumentera contre la 
condition de l’urgence suprême de Michael Walzer pour proposer une approche qui 
laisse les principes de bases du jus in bello intactes.  Ce texte suggère que les théoriciens 
de la guerre juste se penchent sur la question des armes prohibées pour avoir un impacte 
positif dans le domaine de l’éthique de la guerre.
Mots Clés : Armes, Urgence Suprême,  Jus in Bello, Histoire de la Guerre, Philosophie
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Abstract
Just war theory has been provided the basis for thinking about the morality of war for 
the past thousand years of Western history.  However, the nature of warfare has 
dramatically altered in the last 50 years alone.  With the advent of new technologies all 
aspects of warfare from the nature of the battlefield to the types of weapons used have 
changed.  What this paper will argue, through a historical analysis of these technological 
changes, is that the principles guiding actions taken in war, the principles of jus in bello, 
are well equipped to deal with these changes.  More specifically, this paper will argue 
against Michael Walzer’s famous supreme emergency condition and suggests instead 
that just war theorists should instead be concerned with weapons prohibitions, not in 
undermining the established principles of jus in bello, in order to have a favourable 
impact on contemporary warfare.     
Key Words: Weapons, Supreme Emergency, Jus in Bello, History of Warfare, 
Philosophy
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Introduction
 To say that technology has drastically altered the ways in which we engage in every 
facet of our daily lives is such an obvious statement that it doesn’t even deserve qualification.  
Unless you live an intentionally detached a hermetic life in the woods your life is constantly 
touched by modern technology and ways of being.  Nowhere is this more apparent than in the 
ways we engage in warfare.  In the last half-century alone, warfare has dramatically changed in 
nature.  We have gone from battlefields and trench warfare spanning a few hundred meters to 
autonomous robotic warriors capable to flying themselves across numerous international borders 
and returning to home base in one refuelling.  Given the changes in the ways modern warfare is 
waged an obvious question comes to mind: Do our moral theories regarding just conduct in war 
have the capacity to deal with these changes in the nature of warfare?  
 The history of just war theory spans the last thousand years of Western civilization and, 
not surprisingly, many changes to the original principles have happened over this time period.  
Notably, the idea that the authority to engage in war is granted by God to a sovereign has been 
altogether abandoned in modern secular societies.1  However, what is somewhat surprising is 
that the first aspect of just war theory to be developed, the principles governing the actual 
practice of war, jus in bello, have been its most stable components.  The two principles that have 
been reiterated time and time again (stated in their most abstract forms) are discrimination: the 
distinguishing between those targets that are allowed and those that are prohibited, and 
proportionality: the use of minimal force for achieving a military goal.  Different authors have 
argued for different interpretations of these rules, but no just war theorist, religious or secular, 
has argued for a version of just war theory that did not include these two basic principles.  The 
foundations of just war theory seem to have survived through so many technological and 
cultural innovations that they are now solidly engrained in our common morality.  However, 
with Michael Walzer’s most recent and highly influential revival of just war theory in the 1970’s 
1 James Turner Johnson, "Just War, as It Was and Is," First Things  (2005): 14.
certain additions to jus in bello may risk undermining the applicability of the foundational 
principles of proportionality and discrimination.  This paper is, very generally, arguing for a 
traditional reading of the basic principles of jus in bello, while at the same time arguing that 
changes to just war theory should come at the level of more practical considerations.  More 
concretely, just war theory needs to take new technologies, which affect the ways in which wars 
are fought, into account, while preserving the place of the basic tenets of jus in bello.  In so 
doing the basic spirit of just war theory will be maintained, that of limiting the destructiveness 
of war, while remaining relevant in the future.    
Organization
In order to argue persuasively that the basic principles should be safeguarded a cursory 
look at the history of warfare will be undertaken.  Obviously the last thousand years have seen 
many changes in the ways wars have been fought but for the purposes of this project a more 
limited timeline has been set at the end of the 19th century.  The choice of any specific date is 
arbitrary in the sense that no date can be plausibly set for the start of the changes that would 
drastically alter the nature of warfare from those changes that preceded them.  However, the 
beginning of the 20th century and WWI more specifically seems a good time to start our 
investigation as it corresponds roughly to the start of the industrial revolution, which would 
initiate our reliance upon mechanization and automation in all spheres of life, beginning with the 
way we fight wars.  The first chapter of this paper will introduce the basic concepts of just war 
theory focusing on the principles of jus in bello;  then part one will move on to deal with the 
changes to warfare that were the direct result of the industrial revolution and focusing on the two 
World Wars.  
The changes that are the focus of part one took place in many different spheres 
including agriculture, communications and transportation as well as weaponry but they were all 
due to technological advancement in some way, for the first time, large armies were able to 
attack one another with long distance weapons.  It is not surprising that the first attempts at 
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international cooperation with the aim of establishing a body of laws that would be directed at 
warfare were developed during this time period.  The Hague (1899) and Geneva (1864) 
conventions, which have been modified and combined since their first inceptions, were 
developed when the first consequences on modern weaponry were being felt on battlefields 
across Europe.  It should be noted that the attempts at codifying humanitarian laws in the 
international community are not a direct reflection of the intellectual/academic attempts at 
establishing the moral principles related to warfare, although they overlap on many key points.  
This paper will focus on the moral literature and not on the significant body of international law 
that has been developed and discussed at length by legal scholars and law makers.    
Chapter 2 will deal more specifically with new developments in weapons technologies 
that built upon existing technologies used in the two World Wars, notably: smart bombs 
(precision guided munitions), biological weapons, non-lethal weapons, robotic warriors, and 
others.  These new weapons technologies force us to reconsider our moral evaluation of 
weapons as such, weapons have traditionally not been banned in just war theory (although they 
have been subject to bans in international law); instead, their use has been restricted to 
legitimate targets.   One problem with leaving weapons regulation out of the debate within just 
war theory is that the types of weapons available determine to a large extent how and which 
wars are fought.  New weapons, it will be argued, should be subject to critical debate regarding 
their admissibility in warfare but looking at new weapons has a secondary importance for just 
war theorists because this debate forces us to pay attention to new questions regarding who is a 
legitimate target in war and what rights we accord to non-traditional combatants.  These debates 
will be more directly addressed in part four.
Before turning to these interesting questions in part four, part three will address the 
contemporary debates in just war theory regarding who is a combatant and whether or not it can 
ever be justifiable to directly attack non-combatants.  This literature is important for the question 
of restricting weapons because those who support the possibility of attacking non-combatants 
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cannot argue convincingly against the development of indiscriminate weapons.  This section will 
mostly be concerned with countering Michael Walzer’s argument for what he terms the 
“Supreme Emergency Condition” in order to argue that his proposed amendment of just war 
theory undercuts the principles of discrimination and proportionality and, consequently, leaves 
jus in bello open to abuse making it less useful as a guide to our actions.  Once this element of 
Walzer’s theory has been successfully argued against2 the questions of the contemporary 
application of just war theory to problems like terrorism and guerrilla warfare are taken up in  
part four.  This section’s aim is to test how the principles apply to actual cases of warfare against  
non-state aggression that does not fit easily into the mould of traditional warfare.  Questions 
such as: who is a legitimate combatant in these cases and how a state may counter non-state 
actors who pose a threat to the security of its citizens will be addressed.  This debate will bring 
the question of weapons back to the forefront of the discussion because the current 
developments in weaponry are focused on these types of threats and our moral assessment of the 
attempts to deal with these cases will determine what kinds of weapons are continued to be 
developed and produced in the future.  
With the threat posed by war mounting as our ability to kill one another improves we 
cannot afford to be complacent on these issues.  Our politicians speak the language of just war 
saying that such and such a campaign was unjustified for certain reasons.  Therefore, it is 
imperative that we arm just war theory with the tools necessary for guiding policy makers in our 
society so that the threat of war becomes less rather than more acute.                                     
Part 1: History
1.1 What is Just War Theory?  
iv
2 It should be noted that only Walzer’s position relative to weapons prohibitions and the Supreme 
Emergency are at issue in this paper.  His stance on just war theory more generally is accepted.   
The history of humanity is littered with wars of all sorts that were carried out for a host 
of different reasons, resulting in death and destruction that has rightly shocked the consciousness 
of mankind.  The realists among us exclaim that humans are naturally violent beings who will 
conduct war as long as we exist and deny any attempts at creating peace in our world.  The 
pacifists, on the other side of the coin, recognize in humanity a desire for peaceful cohabitation 
and decry the use of war to solve political problems.  In between these two extremes are just war 
theorists.  The latter embrace both the peaceful and violent sides of human nature and try to 
reconcile them by limiting the potential resorts to war and limiting its destructive capacity.  In 
other words, as the Catholic Church has been saying for over a thousand years since the time of 
St. Augustine of Hippo, just war theory begins with a “presumption against war”, which can 
only be overturned if certain conditions are met.3
While the Church has always been concerned about what Christians can morally do to 
other Christians, in order for just war theory to have any force in the international realm with its 
various religious groups a secular version of just war theory was needed.  The first 
secularization of just war theory came with Hugo Grotius’ publication of three books, On the 
Law of War and Peace, in 1625.  This began the move for a system of international laws binding 
all states regardless of religious affiliation.  Since the time that Grotius was writing in the 17th 
century warfare has dramatically changed and continuously offers up new challenges to the just 
war theorists who attempt to limit its destructive capacities.  The 20th century alone provides a 
huge array of wars for study and analysis starting with traditional wars of standing armies facing 
each other on open battle fields, moving to the trench warfare of the first and second world wars 
and progressing through to the jungles of Vietnam and Korea .  The 21st century has seen yet 
another technological leap that was unconceivable even 15 years ago with the proliferation of 
new “smart” bombs and other methods of targeted killing used in the “war on terror”.  So, while 
the history of warfare provides a huge arena for analysis this paper will focus on the relevance 
v
3 Johnson, "Just War, as It Was and Is," 18.
of just war theory as applied to the 20th century and beyond, which in itself provides far too 
much material for the scope of this paper.  The ensuing analysis of the history of warfare in this 
period will focus on the technological advances that characterized the move from one form of 
warfare to the next.  Hopefully, what will come out of this discussion is material that will show 
that although the basic principles of just war have been around since the 17th century in their 
secular form, they are still useful tools for the 21st century and beyond.  
An obvious question at this point is, what are the principles of just war theory and how 
do they work to limit the negative effects of war?  The modern theory of just war comprises 
three distinct but related areas that work together to determine which types of war are justifiable 
(Jus ad Bellum), which acts of war are permissible (Jus in Bello), and finally how to re-establish 
peaceful coexistence once war is over (Jus post Bellum).  The moral rules of war are expressed 
as positive rights that states possess.  So, for example, a state has the right to defend itself and its 
citizens against attack from an aggressor.  This right stems from the state’s duty to protect the 
life and liberty of its citizens.  In this way just war theory is not simply a list of rules that states 
agree to follow based on some kind of consensus.  In other words, it is not based on a 
consequentialist calculation that judges that following the rules is in everyone’s best interests, 
even if this turns out to be the case.   Just war theory does not depend on states coming to an 
agreement the way they might sign other international agreements in favour of, say, free trade.  
The rules of just war would be applicable morally even if no one else obeyed them because they 
are based on fundamental values, such as freedom, and sovereignty, that all nations need in order 
to function justly.  The question remains as to whether sub-state groups and inter-state players 
have the same rights given they do not always act for the protection of a community.  These 
questions will be addressed subsequently.  For the moment we will turn to the basic rules of 
engagement that constitute Jus in Bello.  
1.2 Jus in Bello: Discrimination and Proportionality
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For now we will leave aside the interesting debates that surround Jus ad Bellum and Jus 
post Bellum and focus on the moral principles that underlie how wars are actually carried out.  In 
laying out the principles of Jus in Bello most authors agree that which side is just and which is 
unjust in having resorted to war (if this is even something that can be determined) is irrelevant to 
applying the rules of engagement.  The two basic principles that apply to both sides are 
discrimination and proportionality.  The principle of discrimination, defined primitively, makes 
it immoral for a military campaign to target people who are not actively engaged in warfare.  
Who is defined as “actively engaged in warfare” will change depending on the situation, but the 
basic principle respects the immunity of at least some members of the society engaged in war.  
For example, at the very least children and babies cannot be held responsible for the actions of 
their government whom they did not elect and do nothing to support.  This first criteria for 
conducting a just war campaign is absolute in its condemnation of attacks against people who 
pose no threat to the opposing forces.  What counts as a “threat” will be addressed in part 4.  
The second principle of jus in bello is consequentialist in nature.  It says that whatever 
series of actions are judged necessary to the winning of the war these should be achieved with 
the least possible damage to the opponent’s forces and infrastructure.  In other words, given 
military objective ‘A’ choose among the various options ‘x, y, z,’ for achieving this objective the 
one that will cause the least amount of damage overall, both to your own troops and 
infrastructure and the opponent’s.  But proportionality is not just about creating the least amount 
of destruction for its own sake.  Proportionality also respects the fundamental reason for having 
a unified just war theory in the first place.  Without proportionality there would be no condition 
that took into consideration the desire to have fewer and less destructive wars in general and the 
desire to have peaceful international relations after the end of the fighting.  If one side decimates 
the other so totally that there is no other side to speak of at the end of the conflict, then the spirit 
of just war has been violated, even in the unlikely scenario that total decimation creates a much 
shorter war with fewer overall casualties.
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If discrimination and proportionality were the only principles affective in jus in bello, 
characterizing which tactics are allowed and which are prohibited would already be a complex 
task.  There would already be room for debate about who is considered a legitimate target in war 
and who is a combatant.  These debates will be addressed later on when discussing actual cases 
and how just war theory is applied to them.  However, the complexity does not end at this level 
of theory.  Secondary principles have been proposed by just war theorists to allow for certain 
breaches of the primary principles in specific circumstances.  The reason for allowing these 
breaches to take place is due to concerns of applicability to actual cases of warfare.  If 
proportionality and discrimination separately were the only principles at work, then it would be 
virtually impossible to fight a war justly.  This is due to the absolute nature of the principle of 
discrimination.  If the application of the principle of discrimination remained absolute, then only 
instances of war in which we could be certain that no “innocent” civilians were harmed would 
be justifiable; as such only wars in totally uninhabited areas (the ocean, the desert) would be 
possible.  In order to get around this limitation the doctrine of double effect is applied to the 
principle of discrimination.
1.3 The Doctrine of Double Effect (DDE)
The doctrine of double effect (DDE) recognizes the fact that sometimes engaging in an 
action has positive effects, which are desired, as well as negative ones, which are foreseen but 
not desired.  The DDE allows the action to be performed even with the foreseen consequences of 
the negative effect in the condition that four criteria are met.  1. The action performed is morally 
permissible in general.  2.  The agent only intends the good effects of his actions and not the bad 
ones.  3.  The bad effect is not a means to the good.  4.  The good effect is proportional to or 
greater than the negative effect, incorporating the principle of proportionality into 
discrimination.  As Brian Orend points out the DDE may seem “fishy” due to its technical 
nature, but, he reminds us, “it is an idea rendered complex by the complexity of the situation it 
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deals with.”4  An example will help to clarify this concept.  Imagine a case in which a legitimate 
military target, say a munitions factory, is located in an industrial area of a city.  Attacking the 
military target, which is normally permissible (criteria 1), will have the foreseen effect of 
destroying nearby factories and injuring or even killing factory workers.  In this case criteria 2 
and 3 are met because only the destruction of the factory is desired and not the collateral damage 
and the collateral damage is not the means to destroying the intended target.  Criteria 4 may be 
harder to justify because it requires weighing the positive effects against the negative ones.  The 
question that must be answered is whether the target’s elimination can justify the collateral 
damage inflicted on innocent civilians and non-military installations.  This will depend on the 
amount and type of destruction caused.  If the target is very important and the damage minimal, 
then it may well be justifiable.  
The DDE is very important in that it allows modern warfare to take place in populated 
areas where destruction of property and life is always a foreseen effect of war.  The technologies 
and means of fighting that have developed over the last century have had a dramatic effect on 
civilian populations during wartime.  As Igor Primoratz notes:
At the outset of the twentieth century, the number of civilians killed in war was low 
relative to the number of soldiers killed: one civilian per every eight soldiers.  By the 
end of the century, the ratio had been reversed: now eight civilians get killed for every 
soldier that falls in battle.5 
This dramatic change in the proportion of civilians killed in wartime may lead just war theorists 
to question any leeway granted to the principle of discrimination such as the DDE.  This 
problem will be addressed later, but for now let us turn to an examination of the wars that 
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4 Brian Orend, The Morality of War (Toronto: Broadview Press, 2006), 115.
5 Igor Primoratz, ed. Civilian Immunity in War (Oxford: Oxford University Press,2007), 4. (Author's 
emphasis)
forever changed the ways of conducting battles in the technological age that is the twentieth 
century.
2.1 Modern Warfare: World War I contrasted with 19th century warfare
 Although it would be artificial to claim that the First World War by itself marked a 
distinct change in the way of carrying out war there are, nonetheless, several key factors that 
distinguish WWI from earlier European wars.  Moreover, there is an obvious reason for this 
change, namely, the industrial revolution.  Along with key changes in society that are still being 
felt over a hundred years later, such as a reconfiguration of society from a mostly agricultural 
and rural one to an urban consumer one,6 warfare and the reasons for going to war would 
forever be changed.  Max Boot in his book entitled War Made New describes the shift that took 
place in the late 1800’s and early 1900’s and he points out four closely related factors that 
changed how wars were carried out.   The first of these factors was conscription, which 
increased the size of armies making it necessary to adopt new and stricter codes of conduct 
within the army itself.  The second is the use of the train (widespread in Britain by 1840) and 
steamship to transport these troops across long distances, making it possible to wage wars more 
effectively in remote locations.  The third is the use of the telegraph (invented in 1837) to 
coordinate movements of troops.   And the fourth and probably the most important to the shift in 
war tactics was the development of new weapons such as repeating rifles and machine guns.7  
The accuracy and range of the artillery used in WWI would have been unimaginable only a few 
decades earlier during the Franco-Prussian war (1870-71).  The advent of machine guns made 
frontal attacks virtually impossible and forever changed the dynamics and destructiveness of 
warfare in the modern age.  
x
6 Max Boot, War Made New: Technology, Warfare, and the Course of History, 1500 to Today (New York: 
Gotham Books, 2006), 110.
7 Ibid., 196.
Two of the innovations that changed warfare are fairly straight forward, the 
technological innovations of the steam engine and the telegraph made it easier to move and 
communicate making it possible for large bodies of people to be controlled more effectively.  
Prior to these inventions conscript armies did exist but their effectiveness was limited by their 
ability to coordinate their actions.  The combination of the large armies, able to be supplied with 
weapons and food at a rate hitherto unthinkable, and the weapons that these fighters were using 
made warfare in the 20th century bloodier and more destructive than ever before.  The slaughter 
that was the First World War was so unprecedented that it is no surprise that it came as a shock 
to those who fought it; it is these men that we will be concerned with.  The morality of war is 
not determined by the weapons being used, so let us now look at the impact of the one human 
change that characterizes the industrial revolution in warfare, conscription.  
Prior to WWI armies relied heavily on cavalry to speed across battlefields and assault 
the opposing forces, followed by large bodies of infantry.  With machine gun fire crossing the 
battlefield became impossible for troops and horses alike creating a “no man’s land” between 
the opposing forces.  This type of weaponry also created an indiscriminate manner of killing 
compared to earlier techniques.  The physical distance between troops on opposing sides of a 
battlefield widens dramatically with the increasing range of artillery firing capabilities.  The 
type of soldiers engaged in battle along with this physical distancing would have a profound 
effect on the character of fighting.     
 It may be a romantic idealization of warfare prior to WWI to think of soldiers as 
chivalrous men acting based on a code of virtues in warfare.  However, there is evidence to 
suggest that this is not an entirely false categorization; for example, even when machine guns 
were available “generals were intensely suspicious of these industrial death machines that upset 
traditional military doctrines and seemed to leave little room for individual feats of valour.”8  
Soldiers prior to the mechanized era wore colourful uniforms distinguishing one side from the 
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8 Ibid., 152.
other.  The idea of camouflage uniforms would have been unthinkable in an age when being 
dressed in this way could easily get you killed by your own side in hand to hand combat 
situations.  The tactics of warfare have been forever changed by machine guns and further 
technological improvements resulting in the need to hide from the opposing side as opposed to 
confronting it openly.  This hiding and lack of visibility of the opposing side leads to a 
dehumanization of the opponent.  If you cannot see the other side and cannot witness the 
suffering being experienced firsthand, then you will be less likely to act in a way that minimizes 
this suffering.  The choice to minimize suffering no longer resides in the hands of the individual 
soldier, as it did in closer proximity, but in the hand of the commander who chooses the target.  
This change will be addressed in greater detail in part 2 with the developments of new weapons.  
In the new ethic of the larger army soldiers cannot second guess the decisions of superiors or 
they risk the efficiency of the military complex as a whole. There are further psychological 
changes that have an impact on the way wars are fought in the 20th century.  
 Firstly, the new conscript armies needed to defend positions across a long perimeter 
such as the trenches of the First World War are not engaged in the same sort of fighting.  The 
conscript soldier and the professional soldier of the previous century are not of the same breed.  
The conscripted men may in certain cases be people moved by a desire to protect their country, 
but since they are not given the choice of whether or not they wish to join the military, they are 
more likely to have divergent opinions on the benefits of going to war.  The military must 
therefore present the war as one that is absolutely necessary for the survival of the country as 
they know it or the conscript will be a less effective killing machine.  This is not to say that the 
knight did not recognize the horror of going to war, but generally these men were not sent to 
certain death on the front lines and they had something concrete to gain by heading out into 
battle.  
Before WWI and the need for large conscripted armies those who went to war had 
something concrete to lose if they did not fight.  Landowners tended to go to war in the cavalry 
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and bring along with them men from the general population as infantrymen equipped by the 
richer aristocracy.  If the army failed the men risked damage to their personal property and 
families.  Conscripts sent overseas do not have this type of direct motivation for going to war.  
In order for them to be convinced they must believe in the causes for the war.  As Michael 
Walzer says, “it is the success of coercion that makes war ugly.”  Without the ability to conscript 
a huge number of soldiers they would not have died in the trenches of WWI.  Walzer argues that 
“soldiers dies by the thousands at Verdun and Somme simply because they were available, their 
lives nationalized, as it were, by the modern state.”9  This is one instance where the principles of 
Jus ad Bellum become very important for the purposes of actually fighting a modern war.  The 
justification of the war by the government and the armed forces becomes essential to troop 
retention and success in the war effort overall.  That is not to say that convincing troops of the 
validity of the war they are fighting only became important in the 20th century.  To the contrary, 
this was among the major motivations for the creation of the just war doctrine, as it was laid out 
by St. Augustine, in the first place.  For Augustine the just war doctrine “was intended to be a 
workable ethical guide for the practicing Christian who also had to render unto Caesar his 
services as a soldier.”10  In a sense the just war doctrine was created in order to permit wars to 
take place in a religious context where they normally would have been disallowed.  In the 
modern context the concern is not with allowing wars to take place but in limiting the recourse 
to war, as they are an unfortunate reality of our international relations.  
 WWI was important because it delivered brutality of a scope unheard of in the previous 
centuries of warfare and it necessitated a re-examining of the need to restrict the reasons for 
recourse to war as well as the actual methods employed in these wars.  The creation of the 
League of Nations after WWI was surely an attempt by the international community to come to 
terms with the horror of the First World War.  Whether the League Covenant was in line with the 
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9 Michael Walzer, Just and Unjust Wars: A Moral Argument with Historical Illustrations, 4th ed. (New 
York: Basic Books, 1977), 34-35.
10 Lynn H. Miller, "The Contemporary Significance of the Doctrine of Just War," World Politics 16, no. 2 
(1964): 255.
traditional just war doctrine or not is of little importance.  What is significant in the creation of 
the League and its Covenant is the fact that the issue of just war was finally being discussed in 
the international arena after a hiatus of over two centuries.11  However, these discussions did 
nothing to restrict the violence that was to occur during the next World War.  This is where the 
technologies only tested in the First World War would finally see the light of day and change the 
face of warfare as we knew it.
 Before moving on to the next stage of technological changes that would change warfare 
let us take a moment to review the effects of the industrial revolution on the applicability of the 
basic principles of jus in bello.  The basic principles of discrimination and proportionality are 
already becoming more difficult to apply with the distancing of opposing sides.  This is not to 
say that they are impossible to apply, just that they need to be adopted into the mentality of the 
growing military complex by the different levels of command.  Instead of individual soldiers 
making moral decisions on a case by case basis, commanders need to be aware of the effects of 
their decisions on the morality of war.  Take discrimination, when the individual soldier can no 
longer see his target the chance that the discrimination principle is being violated augments.  
That is not to say that it is necessarily being violated and the same thing goes for proportionality. 
It is still possible to fight a mechanized war with only the minimal amount of force and 
destruction possible, however, this task becomes more difficult when a stalemate occurs 
between the opposing sides and new techniques need to be adopted to push through the no 
man’s land of the trenches.  What we mean by proportionality seems to have changed when 
comparing the battles of the pre-industrial age with industrial ones.  The amount of destruction 
tolerated has changed with the methods of fighting.  In WWI alone eight million soldiers were 
killed with twenty-two million wounded and millions more in civilian deaths.12  Unfortunately 
these shifts were only the beginning, with the destructiveness of the Second World War far 
outstripping the First.     
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2.2 World War II: The Second Industrial Revolution
 Many of the inventions of the beginning of the 20th century would have a profound 
impact on the fighting of World War Two.  They would build on and transform former methods 
of communication; transportation and targeting that were only touched upon in the First World 
War.  Among these inventions are: “electrical generators, internal combustion engines, motor 
vehicles, airplanes, radios, telephones, radar,”13 etc. during this time Germany and Japan were 
harnessing these new technologies and building “the most advanced armed forces in the world” 
in order to reach their goals of domination.14  All the while, during the war interim period, the 
other major world powers (England, France and the United States) were more concerned with 
developing these technologies for commercial and individual uses.
 Obviously with so many new inventions coming to the fore during this period there are 
many effect and not all of them can be touched upon in detail for the present purposes.  For 
example the widespread use of the radio and television as methods of spreading propaganda 
would have an effect on the duration of the war effort despite extreme civilian death tolls and 
property loss.  Without these tools motivating people to rally behind the war effort would have 
been very difficult.  For our purposes here we will focus on the two technological leaps that had 
the greatest impact on the actual fighting of the war, differentiating it from the stalemate that 
characterized WWI; these being the tank and the airplane. 
2.21 Tanks
 With the First World War’s Western Front proving to be virtually impervious to frontal 
attack armies now needed a replacement for the age old “knight in shining armour.”  They 
would get this replacement in the form of the tank.  The first models tested during WWI were so 
fragile and prone to mechanical failure that they were not able to serve their intended purpose.  
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However, by the time Germany was invading France in 1940, Hitler had built up an impressive 
tank division with a commander at its head.  The tanks in this division were worlds away from 
the WWI models and took advantage of other technologies of the day, including radio 
transmitters in every one to control strategic movements in the heat of battle.  Although the 
allies had developed tanks themselves, in fact they were the first to develop them; they were not 
in preparation for a battle and were concerned more with building up fortifications than with 
offensive weaponry.  The politics of appeasement and defensive strategy proved a fatal error for 
the French who saw their defensive system breached in what they thought would be a stalemate 
similar to that of 1914.  The German conquest of France over a six week period in 1940 was not 
achieved due to their superior material resources; rather it was due to “their decisive edge in 
doctrine, training, planning, coordination and leadership.”15  
The swift takeover of France had the effect of dramatically reducing the number of 
casualties suffered by the Germans compared to their experience in WWI.  By the time of the 
French armistice in June 1940 the Germans had suffered 150,000 killed, wounded and missing 
soldiers.  This number was equal to only one third of the casualties of a single battle fought in 
France during the First World War.  However, the effects on the allied forces and the civilian 
population whose villages were being trampled by tanks was opposite in nature.  Over 2.2 
million allied soldiers suffered casualties during this period.16  In retrospect, although the 
Second World War would account for more wartime deaths than ever in the history of modern 
warfare up until that time, what makes it such a terrible massacre has little to do with military 
deaths and casualties.  The percentage of soldiers killed in the Second World War actually 
declined in comparison with its earlier counterparts.  The horror of the 55 million deaths of 
WWII stems from the number of civilian dead in comparison to earlier wars.17  These deaths 
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were not the direct result of fighting per se but of targeted air raids carried out on civilian 
centers.  It is to the development of fighter planes and heavy bombers that we turn next.           
2.22 Airplanes
The major technological development that would shape fighting in the Second World 
War was the invention and amelioration of the fighter plane.  Although the first airplanes were 
developed at the very start of the 20th century they were still in their infant stage during the First 
World War and were not effective enough to make a contribution to this war effort although they 
were being improved upon during this time.  As Boot reports:
In 1914 the typical airplane was a biplane or triplane made of wood, cloth and 
wire.  By the war’s end in 1918 all-metal monoplanes were being produced that 
were recognizably modern in their design.  Top speed of airplanes increased from 
126 miles per hour in 1913 to 171 mph in 1920.18
 Obviously, the usefulness of the airplane was not lost to military strategists and they were 
improved upon greatly throughout the interim period.  “By 1939 the record was up to 469 
mph.”19
 However, it was not the mere development of the airplane as a machine of war that 
makes it noteworthy for the purposes of just war theory.  What distinguished the airplane as a 
weapon of war were the particular uses it was put to.  As McKeogh notes: “Weapons themselves 
are not (usually) unlawful in and of themselves.”20  What counts is how they are used with 
respect to the principle of discrimination.  The first models of air bombers were not capable of 
precision targeting and may not have been just weapons, but leaving this possibility aside (as 
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they would quickly improve making precision bombing possible by 1944) the major concern 
with airplanes is that they were used by both the allies and the Germans to target civilian 
populations in the hopes of quashing the morale of the population and hampering the efficiency 
of the opposition’s military.  As was mentioned earlier, troop morale, drafting and retention is 
essential in modern warfare, so that if a civilian population does not support the war effort it is 
impossible to carry on for a long period of time.  By 1941 Britain began embarking on a series 
of air strikes against the German populace with the hopes that “citizens would demand an end to 
war in the instinct of self-preservation.”21  The effects of this strategy were staggering causing 
an estimated 500,000 German civilian deaths with another million suffering serious injury and 
approximately 3 million homes destroyed.22  In this case not even the pretence of following the 
rules of just war was made.  Churchill argued that “’it was necessary to do unto others as they 
were doing to Britain’ in order to maintain the nation’s morale.”23  Despite the brutality of these 
attacks no charges were laid upon the British prime minister at the war’s end when so many 
others were being tried for violating the rules of engagement.  What is so paradoxical about the 
adoption of this technique by Britain is that it countered the very values that it was fighting for 
in the first place.  As Garrett notes: “Britain was fighting to maintain values of respect for 
dignity and integrity of each single individual but adopted a method of war so destructive as to 
threaten the very cause for which she was fighting.”24  Attempts have been made to justify these 
attacks through the creation of a new condition within just war theory: the supreme emergency 
condition.  This condition was developed by Michael Walzer as a direct response to the British 
air raids.  The next section will review the supreme emergency condition and assess its worth as 
a tool within the just war tradition.  For the moment, however, we will briefly turn to the most 
significant technological innovation to come out of the Second World War, although as we will 
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see, this innovation would prove less controversial for the purposes of just war theory.  This 
innovation is the atomic bomb.
2.23 Atom Bombs
 When the first atom bombs fell on Hiroshima and Nagasaki on August 6th and 9th 1945 
the results were immediate.  The total dead in the hours following the bombings amounted to 
220,000 people with thousands more dying of exposure to radiation long after the initial attack.  
The vast majority of those dead were civilians.  The bombings provoked such an intense fear 
around the world that no nuclear bombs have been dropped since that time.  There is consensus 
in the international community that nuclear weapons are unjust by their very nature, this is 
significant because typically just war theory does not make pronouncements on a weapon’s 
development and use, judging them instead on whether they respond to the criteria of 
discrimination and proportionality.  Despite the International Court of Justice’s refusal to ban the 
use of nuclear weapons outright there “exists an obligation to pursue in good faith and bring to a 
conclusion negotiations leading to nuclear disarmament in all its aspects under international 
control” in international law.25  The Hague and Geneva conventions also ban the use of chemical 
and biological weapons, excessively injurious weapons and those which alter the natural 
environment.26  Nuclear weapons clearly respond to the two last conditions even if they are not 
mentioned explicitly.  This international consensus makes nuclear weapons less troubling for 
just war theorists than traditional air raids because they seem to be totally immune from 
justification.  There is not only an effort to ban the use of nuclear weapons but also their 
proliferation and the threat of their use.27  Now let us turn to Walzer’s supreme emergency 
condition to see how air raids are typically justified within just war theory.
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Part II: Newer and Better Weapons?
3. Smart Bombs
 So called “smart” bombs differ from their “unintelligent” predecessors in that they are 
able to be controlled once they have been fired.  Previous projectiles, like the ones developed 
and used in WWII, were subject to the laws of gravity and ballistics once they left the bomb bay 
and, as such, they were not very accurate.  This made firing bombs very costly both for the 
armies developing and producing the planes and bombs as well as the targets on the ground who 
suffered large amounts of devastation when they were missed.  However, smart bombs change 
the playing field altogether and, it may be argued, that they can benefit both sides in a struggle.  
The air force dropping the bombs suffers far fewer casualties because it can send out a much 
smaller number of planes and pilots to attain the same ends in addition, the people on the ground 
suffer fewer casualties because the bombs dropped hit their targets much more accurately than 
they did before.  As Max Boot explains, the changes in technology have been drastic since 
WWII:
During World War II, an average B-17 bomb during a bombing run missed its target by 
some 2,300 feet.  Therefore, if you wanted a 90 percent probability of having hit a 
particular target, you had to drop some nine thousand bombs.  That required a bombing 
run of one thousand bombers and placed ten thousand men at risk.  By contrast, with the 
new weaponry one plane flown by one man with one bomb could have the same level of 
probability.  That was an improvement in effectiveness of approximately ten-thousand-
fold.28  
Having fewer soldiers fighting in wars may be a good thing when looking back at the great wars 
of the past century.  With the advent of new precision-guided weapons the age of total war was 
ended.  As George and Meredith Friedman recount:
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Suddenly, inexpensive missiles carried by a small ship, a few planes, or by infantrymen 
proved themselves capable of shattering the behemoths of the reigning military culture.  
Giant warships, massive tanks, invulnerable bridges, all suddenly fell before a handful 
of simple and relatively inexpensive weapons.29
Equally positive results occurred on the side of those being targeted, so long as the actual targets 
are morally permissible ones that follow the rule of discrimination, the advances in technology 
mean far fewer deaths due to collateral damage.  Bombs that use the new precision-guided 
technology enabled by Global Positioning Systems (GPS) rarely, if ever, miss their targets.  So 
that by the time of the second Iraqi war “the ordinary citizens in Baghdad frequently went about 
their business even as bombs were falling.”  The bombs were so accurate that the citizens “had 
quickly become accustomed to bombs hitting their intended military targets-so much so that 
when one went astray and landed in a residential area, they were incensed.”30  Although these 
results may at first seem spectacular in that they do not have any obviously negative effects a 
closer look reveals certain moral difficulties.  These difficulties come at two stages, the first at 
the level of the principles of jus in bello and the second at the level of on the ground application.  
We will look at the latter first.
3.1 Discriminate Compared to What? 
One problem with so called “smart” bombs is that they are typically not judged as 
discriminate independently but only as compared to traditional projectiles, as the above citation 
regarding effectiveness suggests.  What this type of reasoning takes for granted is that the 
original bombs in question were able to meet the requirements of discrimination and 
proportionality and this is not obviously the case.  There are two possible ways that bombs can 
be judged, either taking into consideration their actual usage in the context of their development, 
or independently.  I would like to argue that given the nature of warfare what we care about is 
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whether a weapon can actually be used in a rule abiding manner given the contemporary 
landscape and not some abstract set of conditions.     Brian Orend argues contrary to Walzer that 
weapons should be judged individually in their customary usage in order to determine whether 
they can meet the requirements of jus in bello.  Walzer argues that weapons, with the exception 
of nuclear weapons31, are not just or unjust in and of themselves but that they can only be judged 
as such in each individual situation.  Following Orend, I believe that this allows too much 
because it does not take into consideration the effects of weapons proliferation in the world.  In 
effect what Walzer is condoning is the development of new technologies of destruction but then 
after the fact he says to those who have developed them to only use them in the right ways, if 
this is within the realm of possibility.  Orend contends that condemning certain weapons is 
within the basic spirit of just war theory because it seeks to limit the destructiveness of 
warfare.32  
There are obviously certain technologies that have already been judged as incapable of 
meeting the requirements of jus in bello.  Notably, weapons of mass destruction, which even 
Walzer agrees cannot be permitted to proliferate.  The question is then; do traditional bombs 
potentially meet these criteria? Looking at the evidence from WWII the types of battlefields and 
targets that were available did not lend themselves to discriminate and proportional aerial 
bombings.  With bombs missing their targets by an average of 2,300 feet you could just as easily 
hit your own troops in situations of combat making it an ill advised choice for cases where 
discrimination is not really at issue.  In situations where discrimination is an issue, near civilian 
centers, the probability of actually hitting your target was so low that the technique was certainly 
not discriminate.  Enter the DDE, does it allow the use of conventional bombs near residential 
areas in order to destroy an acceptable military target, say a munitions factory?  The munitions 
factory is an uncontroversial military target, but it seems a stretch to consider it a “target” of 
aerial bombings.  As we have seen, in order for the DDE to be applied successfully the operation 
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must meet 4 requirements at once, one of which is proportionality; the good (and intended) 
results must be greater or at least proportional to the bad (unintended) ones.  With the amount of 
collateral damage that traditional bombs caused it would be a stretch to say that the vast majority 
of bombings that took place were in conformity even with the conditions of the DDE.  
 Conventional bombs were never banned in international law yet their questionable 
moral standing is evident from the standpoint of just war theory.  Walzer attempts to justify their 
use through the development of the “supreme emergency condition”, which will be discussed 
later.   Europeans who experienced the devastation associated with bombings understood the 
dangers of fighting wars on their soil and have done everything necessary since the Second 
World War to ensure that no wars take place on their territory again; with great success it should 
be noted.  Fighting what are known as “limited wars”, based on the pre-industrial model of 
warfare that we characterised earlier, is no longer possible because of a number of factors.  
However, the most important of these factors, the means of modern warfare, has dictated 
recourse to other methods of international problem solving.  As Westerners we may want to view 
ourselves as diplomatic peoples capable of solving our problems without fighting, but a look our 
history reveals that this method was only employed when fighting wars became too costly and 
dangerous to undertake.  Since the Second World War, Western powers have engaged in many 
wars but only when they believed that the war effort would be quick and decisive and when it 
would not implicate their own citizens on their own territory.  With the Western nations 
developing ever newer and more expensive methods of killing it is imperative that these new 
weapons be judged and treated in international law so as to limit the proliferation of arms in the 
world.  It may be true that smart bombs are better than their traditional counterparts but if they 
create a need to develop ever newer technologies to combat them then they simply add to the 
destructive capacities of world powers, which goes against the spirit of just war theory.  Far 
from having a moral imperative to develop smart bombs, what De George calls a “morally 
xxiii
obligatory smart arms race”,33 there should be a moral imperative against the proliferation of 
highly destructive weapons, smart bombs included in this category with their outmoded 
successors.  
De George, in offering up the argument for a “morally obligatory smart arms race” is 
proposing a typical consequentialist argument for a particular tactic being used instead of 
another, in this case he is advocating the use of particular kinds of weapons as opposed to others. 
At first glance there is nothing special about condemning a weapon or group of weapons that 
makes this kind of moral imperative any less consequentialist than condoning the use of another 
type of weapon.  In effect, the reasons behind the moral judgement remain the same and the 
difference of opinion between those who would ban a smart bomb and those who would support 
its proliferation comes at the level of on the ground application.  The basic idea being 
reformulated as a statement: if x is allowed then the consequences will be worse than if y were 
used in its place.  However, it seems unintuitive to have such an important moral judgement rest 
on these flimsy and easily manipulated grounds.  If there is something morally reprehensible 
about a certain weapon being developed and spread throughout the world, then it seems we 
would want a stronger argument against its development than “it creates more harm than another 
harmful weapon”, what we want is a good reason that can stand the test of time against the use 
of this weapon.  Based on what has been said up until now regarding precision-guided munitions 
it is not obvious that there is a stronger moral imperative than the consequentialist one against 
their use.  However, as we will see in later sections, there are further reasons for believing that 
these weapons ought to be banned that are grounded in a rights-based approach to ethics.  
In War and Ethics, Nicholas Fotion argues that the principles of just war theory can be 
justified in a variety of ways and that the grounds of their justification are of little importance so 
long as they yield the right principles.  He thinks that “because the principle can be justified in 
more ways than one, how it is justified does not appear to be an important consideration.  What 
xxiv
33 De George, "Post-September 11: Computers, Ethics and War," 186.
seems important is that the principle itself is in place in the theory.”34  However, it seems that we 
should care about the justification of our principles because they will have farther reaching 
implications if they are grounded in a rights-based approach than by a consequentialist 
calculation, even if the calculation always, or almost always, yields the results that we find 
intuitively plausible.  The reasons for this will become clearer as we consider possible violations 
of the initial principles that take place when we consider more extreme examples as described 
by Michael Walzer in order to justify his “supreme emergency condition”. 
   
3.2 Smart Bombs and the Doctrine of Double Effect
Another problem facing proponents of smart bombs is that they do not obviously meet 
the requirements of the doctrine of double effect (DDE).  As we have seen before, in order to 
characterize an act of war as just its foreseeable but unintended consequences must be at least 
proportional to the military objective in question. What this means, practically speaking, is 
collateral damage is tolerated up to a certain point.  There are practical reasons for allowing a 
certain degree of collateral damage within just war theory for without this allowance it seems 
modern warfare would become impracticable.  The realist within the just war theorist is aware of 
the fact that war is a dirty business and that sometimes the results will be sub-optimal.  In order 
to save the lives of a greater number of people on both sides sometimes another smaller group of 
people will be unintentionally harmed of killed.  In the abstract the DDE seems like an 
acceptable principle but its application comes at the level of individual decisions and the 
problem with precision-guided munitions is that we do not think of them as creating “collateral 
damage” at all.  
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If the DDE was adopted due to the inaccuracy of previous generations of munitions, 
then the advent of smart bombs should, theoretically, do away with the need for such a clause in 
just war theory.  If you can know, with almost 100% accuracy, what targets will be hit by an air 
assault, which were statistically the most likely to produce unforeseen casualties as compared 
with ground attacks, then the idea that there are “unforeseen” results of the attack is put into 
question.  The category “unforeseen” falls to mistakes in identifying targets in the first place, or 
misinterpreting information, not in the carrying out of the attack itself.  If the target that was hit 
was the intended target, the one identified for destruction by intelligence sources, but it turns out  
not to be what the intelligence said and many innocent people are killed, they were the intended 
targets and not victims of “collateral damage”.  The problems that stem from the processing of 
information in modern warfare are no small matter.  Having access to more and better 
information is a good thing only if this information can be processed and disseminated in a 
reasonable time delay.  This was obvious even right after the first Iraq war and the problems 
with data processing have only gotten worse since then.  In 1996, George and Meredith 
Friedman were already reporting on the problems of the data revolution that was in its initial 
stages: 
Imaging, the Defense Support Program, signal intelligence, electronic intelligence, and 
all other types of reconnaissance platforms, in space and elsewhere, collect vast amounts 
of data-all of it, in its raw form, useless.  The endless stream of digital material is 
incomprehensible unless some system turns the data into information, analyzes the 
information, and then distributes that information to people who are making decisions or 
fighting wars.35
Having the technological capacity to hit intended targets accurately is one thing, having the 
information necessary to carry out this same attack is quite another.  If there is a moral 
imperative to develop precision guided munitions then this imperative carries with it a second, 
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less obvious but equally important moral imperative, to develop the information processing 
capacity necessary to deploy the precision guided weapons properly.  
 The DDE becomes even more problematic as time goes on and technology advances 
there are ever more reasons to assume that it will become less and less relevant for the purposes 
of just war theory.  These reasons will become evident as militaries around the world opt for 
unmanned military vehicles and aircraft.  There are moral implications of keeping both the DDE 
and of allowing precision-guided munitions to be used.  First, as was mentioned, referring to the 
victims of a precision-guided attack as collateral damage masks the fact that in essence these 
people were targeted for attack with a particular military goal in mind.  If civilians are targeted 
with a military goal in mind then this is a direct violation of the principle of discrimination and 
the DDE cannot be applied.  If this is the case each and every time a precision-guided weapon is 
fired then the DDE is theoretically incompatible with this type of weapon.  However, removing 
the DDE from just war theory poses other problems, notably it creates two sets of rules for 
militaries or groups with different technological capacities.  If, as De George argued, there is a 
requirement to use and develop these types of weapons this development comes at the price of 
sacrificing the DDE, which seems like a good thing.  But if the enemy does not have these same 
weapons systems, either because of lack of funds or by choice, then an asymmetrical 
relationship has been created.  One in which the more technologically advanced military is held 
to higher standards than the less developed one.  In other words, the less developed nation can 
legitimately carry out attacks that it knows will kill many civilians while the more advanced is 
required to carry the burden of having sacrificed the DDE.  Seeing as how no military power is 
going to willingly equip its potential enemies with the latest in weapons there seem to be some 
serious problems with the proliferation of new weapons that go beyond a simple calculation of 
how many people are likely to be harmed.  Here we are concerned not only with volume but 
with who is being targeted and how we judge each side in the conflict once the war comes to an 
end.  Given the scope of this paper it will not be possible to go into these problems here but 
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what has been said about “smart bombs” will be relevant in the next sections when considering 
even newer technologies that widen the gap between what different militaries are capable of.      
4. Robots at War
 Excitingly or frighteningly, depending on how you look at these things, what was once 
the stuff of science fiction is now part and parcel of how we conduct real wars and live our 
everyday lives.  Robot vacuum cleaners are only the tip of the iceberg when you consider all of 
the dirty and dangerous jobs that would be best done by a non-human agent.  Today, we are 
developing robots capable of adapting to their environment and making decisions without 
recourse to a human controller.  Robots currently in use in the military require only minimal 
human control. These machines are already revolutionising the way armies fight wars.  Fighter 
jets are now capable of taking off on their own, flying to a site to collect data for reconnaissance 
and of determining whether any targets are present, then returning to base and landing.  The 
moral implications of weapons developed in the two World Wars are still being debated in 
international law so these state of the art technologies are not even on the radar of the 
international community.  What this means is that there is a kind of moral vacuum that exists 
when it comes to regulating new weapons systems.  Robotic actors are not like human agents, 
they have to be programmed to respond in certain ways when confronted with certain 
predictable elements in the environment.  As humans we have an innate ability to respond in 
novel ways to new situations, this is part of what makes us human and not automatons.  Without 
getting into the complex philosophical debate about what constitutes free-will let us assume for 
argument’s sake that humans are not predetermined and are capable of acting in novel ways.  
Robots, at least the current models and likely all robots cannot be considered moral or immoral, 
they are simply acting the way they were programmed to act.  This raises important moral 
questions for the humans developing and using robots for the purposes of waging war.  As a 
military expert at Human Rights Watch, Marc Garlasco, emphasized, there is a profound 
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difference between humans and robots: “The human has morality, has an empathetic response.  
The human has the capability to make complex decisions; they can draw on their humanity.”  
Moreover, this humanity is not easily mimicked.  “You can’t just download international law 
into a computer.  The situations are complicated; it goes beyond black-and-white decisions.”36  
4.1 Who is Responsible for a Robot’s Mistakes?
One of the moral questions that becomes important in this context is: who do we hold 
responsible for the mistakes of robotic weapons systems?  It is notoriously difficult to program 
robots to do even the simplest human tasks.  They have even been called “ridiculously stupid” 
because “they lack the common sense of a two-year-old.”37  And this is important for ethics 
because our human morality is grounded in this ability to use common sense.  As P.W. Singer 
recounts in Wired for War, many examples can be found that illustrate the computer’s 
inefficiency when it comes to making common sense judgements, even when they are capable of 
retaining “literally trillions of points of data”.  An example of this is what Singer calls the 
“Apple-Tomato test”, he explains:
For a computer to tell the difference between an apple and a tomato is actually quite 
tricky.  It could resort to all sorts of visual analyses, comparing the size, shape, and 
colour.  But soon the machine would find that in certain cases there would be overlap, so 
any and all tests, no matter how rapid, would be inconclusive.  It would next proceed to 
taking samples, such as capturing its chemical makeup via a smell test, and then 
comparing the data to other known test subjects.  Ultimately, it could only be sure 
beyond any doubt with a DNA sample, which would occupy a massive part of its 
processing power.  By comparison, pretty much any two-year-old human instantly 
“knows” that an apple is not a tomato, without any calculation.38 
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That is not to say that it is impossible for a robot to make these practical judgements, but it 
requires a huge degree of complexity and will be liable to make mistakes that a human would be 
unlikely to make.  For example, a human soldier has no trouble distinguishing enemy troops 
from a group of school children.  What happens when the robot mistakes one group for the 
other?  Who do we hold responsible for this mistake?  The soldier who works alongside the 
robot? The general who authorized the attack?  The robot’s developer?  These are important 
questions for the international agencies charged with charging agents with war crimes and more 
generally, those interested in jus post bellum.  More disturbing is that in the current climate of 
war it is often difficult for human soldiers to tell the difference between an enemy insurgent and 
a civilian.  An enemy who has hidden weapons and is not distinguishing himself as a combatant 
is extremely difficult to pick out in a crowd.  If discrimination is to remain plausible in this 
context and the robots are being designed precisely in this context in order to carry out missions 
that human soldiers cannot do, then we have a serious moral concern on our hands.
 This moral concern is distinct from the related problems that we discussed in part 1 of 
enlarging the battlefield or the dehumanization of the opponent that we saw with previous 
technological innovations from ancient times until the 20th century.  These problems were of 
varying degrees depending on the proximity of the attacking sides and with each step farther 
away there was a related degree of precision that was lost.  That is, until the limitations of the 
human body could be surpassed by getting rid of the human agent altogether.  The goal is still to 
eliminate the opposing side’s troops, but now this task can be carried out by a non-human agent 
that does not have any morality inherent within it.  This is a very important change for just war 
theory because this theory takes for granted that those engaging in battle are equipped with the 
tools necessary to apply the rules that it establishes.  Morality is hallmark of human agents and 
has to be “programmed” into robotic warriors if we hope to salvage any part of just war theory.  
In other words, just war theory is based on a certain conception of human nature and what 
humans are generally capable of.  This theoretical grounding need not be highly idealised, but 
even the minimal conditions, such as being able to empathize with others, even in a limited way, 
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must be present to some degree in order for just war theory to be applicable in the real world.  
This moral sensibility that guides the construction of the rules of jus in bello is likely to not 
apply to robots, no matter what their computing capabilities are.  Even if this were the 
motivating factor guiding robot programmers is it likely that they will ever be able to 
discriminate and act in proportionate ways?          
Assuming for the time being that the robots’ programmers are concerned with abiding 
by rules of war to begin with there remain many obstacles to actually carrying out this task.  If 
the principles of just war theory reflect our moral intuitions regarding what should and should 
not be allowed within the sphere of war, then robots will have to be programmed so as to be able 
to discriminate and make judgements that take proportionality into account.  As was mentioned 
above, discrimination is problematic for robots, but let us assume for argument’s sake that they 
can be perfected so as to be able to distinguish between combatants and non-combatants 
reliably; there remains the issue of proportionality.  Proportionality is already a notoriously 
difficult thing for humans to calculate and it is not obvious what tacit intuitions are at work 
when we determine whether or not to engage in a certain action.  We can, it seems, establish 
hard and fast rules when it comes to discrimination, even if they are not agreed upon by 
everyone, but when it comes to proportionality each situation is so complex that it is unlikely we 
could never anticipate how to program a robot so as to make it act in proportionally even most 
of the time.  This is major obstacle to allowing robot warriors that are capable of autonomous 
actions.
If robots act of their own accord how can we ever claim that rules of just war were 
violated.  In order to be violated they had to have been violated by someone and robots do not 
obviously fit the description of a “someone” capable of moral actions.  At best we can claim that  
some human agent was in control up the chain of command but it is not obvious that this is 
actually ascertainable.        
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4.2 Do Robots Make War More Likely?
If the goal of developing these costly systems is to put fewer soldiers in positions of risk 
in the context of fighting wars, then robotic fighters allow wars to be carried out with fewer 
casualties, but only on the side of the more technologically advanced nations who can afford to 
produce and maintain these systems in the first place.  This may not seem like a particularly bad 
result when looked at from this point of view.  But what it creates for the opposition is a 
situation in which they are not confronted with a human enemy.  Typically wars in the 20th 
century ended when one side was no longer able to suffer the consequences of continuing in the 
war effort, when too many soldiers or civilians had been killed or wounded and the civilian 
population would no longer support the war effort.  This was the case in Vietnam and many 
other wars in the 20th century.  With robotic warriors fewer soldiers may be dying, which is a 
good thing, but it also takes fewer soldiers to cause exponentially more damage than it used to, 
which means that wars become more sellable to a population not afraid of losing a large 
component of its young people when fighting a war.  The soldiers fighting wars today may not 
be in the vicinity of the fighting at all.  One unmanned plane currently in use by the U.S. air 
force is the Global Hawk.  It has significant benefits that make it much better than traditionally 
piloted bombers, like the U-2 spy plane of the cold-war era.  A pilot’s “’physiological factors’ 
limited the amount of time that the U-2 pilots could fly missions (that is, they would pass out 
from fatigue, boredom, or a buildup in their kidneys).”  That is obviously not the case for 
unmanned aircraft.  “In contrast, Global Hawk can stay in the air up to thirty-five hours.” And 
that is not its only virtue.  “Powered by a turbofan engine that takes it to sixty-five thousand feet, 
the stealthy Global Hawk carries synthetic-aperture radar, infrared sensors, and electro-optical 
cameras.”  What these two things in combination mean is that “the drone can fly some three 
thousand miles, spend twenty-four hours mapping out a target area of some three thousand 
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square miles, and then fly three thousand miles back home.”39  All with the only human 
controllers sitting safely at some military base out of harm’s way.        
If the goal of just war theory is to limit the recourse to war as well as its destructiveness, 
then robots seem to run contrary to both these goals.  This is by no means a result that has come 
to be simply by the advent of robotic warriors.  As history has progressed we have found better 
and better ways of killing each other more efficiently, robots simply take the next step towards 
justifying ever more destructive wars.  For example, as Singer recounts:
The modern-day bomber jet has roughly half a million times the killing capacity of the 
Roman legionnaire carrying a sword in hand.  Even within the twentieth century, the 
range and effectiveness of artillery fire increased by a factor of twenty, antitank fire by a 
factor of sixty.  These changes in capabilities then change the way we fight.  For 
instance, exponentially more lethal weapons helped to lead to equivalent exponential 
“stretching” of the battlefield.  In antiquity, when you divided the number of people 
fighting by the area they would typically cover, on average it would take a Greek hoplite 
and five hundred of his buddies to cover an area the size of a football field.  This is why 
in movies like Spartacus or 300 you can see the entire army during a battle.  By the time 
of the American Civil War, weapons had gained such power, distance, and lethality that 
roughly twenty soldiers would fight in that same space of a football field.  By World 
War I, it was just two soldiers in that football field.  By World War II, a single soldier 
occupied roughly five football fields to himself.  In Iraq in 2008, the ratio of personnel 
to territory was roughly 780 football fields per one U.S. soldier.40
Even if the new technologies outlined in the last two sections have been justified by their 
developers and users as better than older counterparts in that they are more discriminate as we 
have seen there is evidence that suggests that there remain reasons for banning or at the very 
least limiting the proliferation of these newer and “smarter” weapons systems.  However, some 
modern technological advances have been put to the task of limiting civilian deaths.  The next 
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two sections will examine computer warfare and non-lethal weapons; two types of weapons that 
have been justified because they can potentially limit civilian suffering.
5. Computers at War
 Computers are what allowed many of the weapons that are now in use in the military to 
be developed.  In and of themselves computers are not a threat to anyone’s personal security and 
their ability to make our lives better in so many ways certainly justifies their existence, morally 
speaking.  However, computers may be used in technologies that are not so positive, as we have 
seen with precision guided munitions and unmanned drones.  What this means is that although 
computers can be used as weapons they should not be banned or restricted in any outright way, 
since they have all sorts of good uses.  The following section will attempt to deal with the moral 
implications of computers when they are used for destructive ends.  One way in which 
computers can be used on their own as weapons is through the disruption or hacking into a 
system that controls essential services or information.  With the use of computers for controlling 
everything from street lights to water treatment plants, our industrial cities are particularly 
vulnerable to attacks and disruption via hacking.  The moral question that stems from this use of 
computers is whether a government can be justified in disrupting the water supply or electricity 
to a city in order to force the enemy into a position of surrender.  
5.1 Who is a Legitimate Military Target?
The defenders of this type of attack on essential services might claim that it is better 
than carpet bombing a city to reach the same objective, which is surely true, but that in itself 
does not justify the attack on civilians.  Simply temporarily disrupting communications or 
electricity in a city would surely not be devastating enough to force an enemy to surrender, 
which is why weapons have been developed that are capable of burning out all electrical circuits 
in a targeted area.  These so called “weapons of mass disruption” are direct energy weapons 
which produce microwaves that deliver “thousands of volts of energy that destroy electronic 
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devices and melt semi-conductors.”41  While hacking in itself may be directed against justifiable 
targets, such as those producing munitions on an assembly line direct energy weapons are much 
less predictable and have farther reaching consequences for civilian populations dependent on 
electronics for all sorts of daily activities.  DeGeorge warns that: 
To deprive [a city like New York] of electricity would be to paralyze it.  And if all the 
circuits were burned out and had to be replaced, the task would be enormous.  Add to 
that the destruction of the communications systems, the transportation system, and all 
the private business computers.  The city would stop functioning except on the most 
primitive level, and hence the effect on innocent civilians would be devastating.42
DeGeorge does not see direct energy weapons as benign simply because they do not produce 
any direct physical harm to people.  He considers that the only morally justifiable use of these 
weapons would be on the battlefield, where they could be used against an enemy’s weapons 
systems with the goal of reducing loss of life.  However, this argument presupposes that a 
battlefield is an identifiable space removed from cities.  More and more this is becoming a 
fictional throwback to the pre-industrial world, as we have seen with the “stretching” of the 
concept of battlefield itself.  With the computers being used to control unmanned drones in 
remote locations (such as Nevada) the likelihood that direct energy weapons could be used in an 
ethically viable way are slim indeed.  More disturbing perhaps, is that even if they had no effect 
on civilian populations and only targeted enemy weapons systems, an attack of this sort would 
“leave enemy troops at the mercy of virtually unopposed bombing, shelling, destruction, and the 
massacre of troops”, creating not fewer but more deaths.43  Obviously, within the conditions of 
proportionality this would be an unacceptable result.   
5.2 What is the Definition of a War?
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Other moral problems arise with respect to the use of computers for fighting wars; 
particularly since September 11 and the declaration by the US of the war on terror.  In this 
context the state of war is ongoing, and although it is currently being directed against particular 
countries, namely Afghanistan and Iraq, the possibilities are literally endless, as any country 
suspected of harbouring terrorists or of funding them is liable to attack.  On September 20, 2001 
George W. Bush addressed congress stating that:
We will starve terrorists of funding, turn them one against another, drive them from 
place to place, until there is no refuge or no rest.  And we will pursue nations that 
provide aid or safe haven to terrorism.  Every nation, in every region, now has a 
decision to make.  Either you are with us, or you are with the terrorists.  From this day 
forward, any nation that continues to harbour or support terrorism will be regarded by 
the United States as a hostile regime.44 
In the interest of homeland security the United States Government has implemented the Patriot 
Act, which contains laws that allow it to observe any citizens in its territory through tapping 
phone lines and hacking into personal computers without a warrant.  The idea being that any 
activity that threatens the country and its citizens will be detected before the potential 
perpetrators have the chance to put their plan into action; the burden of proof for getting a 
warrant being too strict to allow this strategy to be effective.  These laws in combination with 
those that state that a suspected terrorist can be held without trial for an unlimited amount of 
time means that innocent people are being held prisoner in the interest of national security.  
What is so alarming about these changes is that they reduce important civil liberties to citizens 
of the state extending the boundaries of the global war on terror to the very people whom the 
war should be aiming to protect.  If the potential enemy can be living within you own territory, 
then the definition of war itself has been altered.  The state does have a right to protect its 
citizens from potential threats that reside within the country itself.  The problem is that the 
jurisdiction responsible for this is the police, not the army; these institutions are not subject to 
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the same rules and guidelines.  As Steven R. Ratner cautions, “these norms can offer different 
guidance on the legality of tactics against suspected terrorists.”45  Claiming that there is an 
ongoing armed conflict is dangerous for a number of reasons because it puts people who would 
normally be treated as criminals as combatants, and as we know combatants have far fewer 
rights than citizens.  If the potential combatants live within the country at war this is especially 
frightening.  The right of citizens to their civil liberties should not be so callously overridden for 
potential political benefits.
 While computers cannot inflict bodily harm on their own the preceding discussion 
shows how if they remain unregulated and continue to be treated as outside the realm of moral 
regulation the consequences can be drastic.  Computers and their use in all sorts of high-tech 
devices make it possible to target people and whole communities while the global war on terror 
extends the traditional meaning of war and its limited nature.  These two conditions acting 
together render the possibility of fighting unending wars in the future highly likely unless we 
aim to conscientiously restrict the domain of war to a more traditional definition.46              
 
6. Non-Lethal Weapons
 Non-lethal weapons (NLWs), as their name suggests, are weapons that inflict harm 
without killing and they come in many shapes and forms.  They can range from “stun guns and 
stun grenades...[which] temporarily subdue the intended target without inflicting permanent 
damage” to “tranquilizers and sleeping gas...[whose] purpose is to incapacitate the target fro a 
longer period of time.”47  Two types of non-lethal weapons are morally significant for the 
purposes of just war theory.  A NLW can be developed for two distinct purposes, either they can 
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be used so as to incapacitate the enemy combatant, or they can be used to target those who 
would normally be inadmissible under the condition of discrimination.  We will examine both 
possibilities in order to draw out how just war theory deals with these different possibilities.
6.1 Non-Lethal Weapons directed against soldiers
 Soldiers are admissible targets of attack under just war theory because they have 
forfeited their right to not be attacked by being in a position to attack the enemy.  They are 
trained to kill and accept, willingly or unwillingly, to be targets themselves.  If it is permissible 
to target soldiers, then does this mean that it is permissible to attack them using any weapons 
available, or should some weapons be banned because they are worse than others?  Given a 
utilitarian calculation in which death is the ultimate bad consequence and anything short of 
death is preferable to this finality NLWs would necessarily rank as better, morally, than weapons 
that are designed to kill.  However, this may be overstating the matter.  Given the choice 
between an instantaneous death and a life plagued by incapacitating wounds many would prefer 
a quick and painless death to a life of suffering and pain.  It should be noted that many versions 
of utilitarianism would likely get this calculation right.  This accounts for the various legal 
treaties banning weapons that are excessively injurious, such as chemical weapons, which leave 
victims with permanent health problems.  The International Committee of the Red Cross 
distinguishes “four pillars of international humanitarian law on weapons.”  In judging NLWs 
two of the four pillars are particularly important.  First, “weapons that cause unnecessary 
suffering are prohibited” and second, “any other weapons that the international community 
decides are abhorrent for some other reason are prohibited.”48  It is interesting to note the legal 
limbo that most new technologies are subject to.  So long as a weapon is not judged to be 
excessively injurious by the international community it can continue to be used for years without 
consequence.  For example, “Chemical weapons were first introduced in World War I, but they 
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weren’t fully banned until eighty-two years later.”49  Other NLWs that have been on the radar of 
the international community for year are land mines.  Land mines are particularly horrifying for 
a number of reasons.  First, because they are notoriously hard to disarm and remain a threat to 
civilians decades after war’s end and second, because they were developed so as to injure, but 
not kill an enemy combatant so that more resources, in terms of man power would have to be 
used each time a soldier was hit.  The rational goes as follows, one dead soldier is a good result, 
but one injured soldier who has to be carried out of harm’s way and receive ongoing medical 
treatment uses up more of the enemy’s time and man power.  Luckily, in the 1990’s the 
international effort to ban land mines met with success and the effort to find and disarm all 
remaining mines is still underway, although it will likely never be completed successfully.  This 
is one job that robots are particularly well suited to doing and a number of models have been 
developed to do just this dangerous task.
6.2 Non-Lethal Weapons and Civilians
 Some NLWs remain permissible when applied to enemy soldiers such as new weapons 
which emit extreme light or sound in order to disorient the enemy.  Since they do not cause any 
permanent damage and so long as they are not followed up by a massacre of these same 
temporarily debilitated soldiers they appear to pass the Red Cross’ conditions for the 
admissibility of weapons.  The question to ask then is should we permit these NLWs to be 
directed against enemy civilians in times of war?
 NLWs may not kill or even inflict lasting damage as we have seen but there are still 
moral reasons for disallowing their use against civilians.  The restriction against targeting 
civilians go far beyond the duty to not kill these people who pose no threat, this restriction 
means extending rights to civilians, including the right to live but also the right to live freely.  As 
Mayer stresses, “non-combatant immunity does not simply protect the non-combatant from 
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death, but it directs military forces to treat non-combatants differently from soldiers.”50  
Walzer’s formulation of non-combatant immunity states that non-combatants have a right to life 
and liberty; meaning that you cannot coerce an enemy civilian into doing something that he or 
she would not do if it were not a time of war.  This includes forcibly displacing people, even if 
this will have the effect of saving their lives.  Walzer explicitly states that soldiers are required to 
minimize the harm done to enemy civilians, “even if this means incurring greater risk to 
themselves.”51  It may be tempting to base non-combatant immunity on a consequentialist 
calculation in which it can be bargained away for fewer casualties to other non-combatants but, 
as Mayer argues, this goes against the basic concept of non-combatant immunity.  According to 
Mayer non-combatant immunity is much more than not permanently harming civilians; it means 
allowing:
Non-combatants to live life, as much as possible, as they did before the war; this 
includes allowing them to make their own choices.  There may be good reasons why the 
non-combatants choose to remain next to the command bunker or munitions factory.  
Whatever their reasons are, non-combatants do not owe an explanation to the enemy.  
Not allowing non-combatants to make their own choices constitutes harm in itself, and 
this harm is intentional as it is employed to get a clear shot at the legitimate military 
target.  The purpose of non-combatant immunity is to safeguard the basic rights and 
status of non-combatants and identify them as spectators, not participants, of the war.  
Attacking and causing harm to non-combatants to save them from an unintended greater 
harm, even when using NLWs, is still a violation of non-combatant immunity.52
Mayer goes one step further and even denies the use of NLWs in the case of munitions factory 
workers who may have a reduced claim to non-combatant immunity.  While they are not posing 
a direct threat to the enemy they are indirectly involved in the war effort and as such they may 
be attacked while they are at work (although not when travelling to or from work or at home it 
seems).  Even in this case if using NLWs would cause these civilians to leave a factory allowing 
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it to be bombed, this should not be done according to Mayer.  Although the factory worker may 
have a reduced claim to non-combatant immunity he or she is not a combatant.  The opposing 
forces have a responsibility to create the least amount of harm as possible according to the 
principle of proportionality and, as such, they should be concerned with the people in the 
factory, even if to a lesser extent than the people in the surrounding area.  The problem in this 
case is that using NLWs requires a separate military attack on the workers themselves, which 
treats them as though they were combatants liable to attack.  According to Mayer, a proper 
response to this problem would be to attack the factory when it was closed so as to minimize 
harm to non-combatants.
6.3 Non-Lethal Weapons Gone Bad
 A more practical problem with NLWs is that although they may have been developed 
and used with the intention of harming but not killing targets they are subject to defects, which 
often turn fatal.  Mayer mentions two examples of NLW mishaps.  The first happened when 
Russian Special Forces decided to use a sleeping gas to rescue hundreds of hostages.  
Unfortunately, the gas had the effect of killing over one hundred hostages and many of the 
terrorists holding them.  A second case happened in New York City when the police used a stun 
grenade to subdue a suspected drug-dealer.  In this case the stun-grenade caused the woman 
stunned to have a heart attack and die hours later in hospital, and she wasn`t even the intended 
target of the grenade.53  Singer describes even more impressive NLWs with equally disturbing 
side-effects.  One that has been tested in Iraq is nicknamed the "pain ray" and the other the 
"artificial fever".  The first acts by emitting concentrated microwaves that penetrate the top layer 
of the skin and heats up the water inside creating a burning sensation.  Once the ray is turned off 
the pain instantly goes away without leaving a trace.  The artificial fever instantly heats up the 
core body temperature of any human in range causing the person to fall unconscious.  The 
danger with these directed energy weapons is that being off by only a few degrees you can kill 
your intended targets instead of rendering them unconscious.  As Singer warns, "the line from 
xli
53 Ibid.: 224.
nonlethal to lethal is a fuzzy one."54  In other words, even if you reject the idea that targeting 
civilians with NLW’s is wrong, there are still reasons to be sceptical as regards their practical 
use in this context.  
In the next section we will examine a new breed of weapons that have the potential to be 
used as either lethal or non-lethal weapons.  Unlike many of the new-age weapons we have 
looked at up to now they are not very advanced, technologically speaking.  These potential 
weapons are biological agents.             
7. Germ Warfare 
 Germs may not seem like weapons in the traditional sense of the word, up until very 
recently they could not be called weapons at all.  Viruses and bacteria have plagued all manner 
of plants and animals since the dawn of life and they were, up until the last few decades, amoral 
life forms acting according to their own genetic programs (or so goes the story according to the 
presupposition that there is no higher purpose at work in the universe).  In order for the pathogen 
to survive it had to adapt and infect its host in various new ways over the course of history.  
Some pretty remarkable events occurred at the “hands” of various viral outbreaks over the 
centuries, such as the Black Death, yet these outbreaks were not the subject of moral outrage or 
even questioning (except by those who believed they were being punished by God), they were 
simply the results of natural processes.  Even as we speak many viruses are thriving in their 
human and animal hosts, notably AIDS, malaria, Ebola and others, infect and kill a huge number 
of humans every year.  New biological threats differ significantly from their traditional 
counterparts in that they are conscientiously manipulated by humans to achieve their lethal 
results.  
Unlike other technological advances that we have been looking at, such as aircraft, the 
ability to alter diseases was first motivated by a desire to eradicate disease, not to spread it in 
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new ways.   Aircraft may have been developed with the aim of transportation in mind but the 
impetus to develop these technologies came from the military complex and not from the desire 
for new modes of transportation.  With germs, scientists had been working at curing diseases 
long before the military complexes around the world took an interest in developing germs into 
weapons.  The Cold War was the main impetus for developing germs into weapons, what with 
the threat of nuclear war Americans and Russian scientists were trying to stay on pace with the 
technologies that would allow them to dominate the other power.  Since this time, scientists have 
been at work perfecting a new range of “super-bugs” capable of infecting people and animals, 
viruses that are immune to known vaccines and treatments.  What is more, the viruses 
themselves are not the only things being modified.  Scientists are also at work on delivery 
systems capable of infecting the largest number of people possible in a single area, making the 
potential hazards of a bio-attack all the more threatening.  The lethality of these new super-bugs 
is hard to estimate given their variety and how they are spread but one thing that is certain is that 
there are moral implications involved in developing these new technologies.  Germs are such a 
great threat to the survival of humanity that some people in the field have likened bio-warfare to 
nuclear warfare, despite the fact that “only a handful of groups have attempted biological attacks 
and fewer still have succeeded.”55  Nonetheless, as Miller, Engelberg and Broad report:
The contrast to nuclear weapons illustrates why many call germ weapons the “poor 
man’s atom bomb.”  A nation that obtains plans for a crude nuclear device is at the 
beginning of a complex technical challenge that requires staggering, easily detectable 
investments in mines, factories, and nuclear reactors.  But scientists...say they could 
teach a terrorist group how to make devastating germ weapons from a few handfuls of 
backyard dirt and some widely available lab equipment.56  
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The effect of dropping an anthrax bomblet on a densely populated area would not destroy the 
physical structures in place, but would have a devastating effect on the human population with 
results that are very difficult to quantify.          
 What is important for the purposes of just war theory is to discover whether germ 
weapons are a legitimate way for a state to engage its enemy?  If the answer is no, then the 
question of why this particular way of fighting an enemy is worse than other ways of achieving 
similar deadly results must be answered.  In order to get at the heart of this question we will start  
by seeing what our moral judgements are in the controlled environment of the battlefield.  Next 
we will examine the legislation that currently exists banning these weapons in order to see why 
they are more problematic than they seem at first glance.  
7.1 Germs, Proportionality and Discrimination
 While the threat of a pandemic being unleashed on the world’s population is within the 
realm of possibilities when we are discussing the new super-bugs being developed in 
laboratories there may be reasons to believe that germs being used as weapons would not have 
these catastrophic results.  For example, germs could be altered so as to sicken but not kill 
individuals, weakening an enemy’s ability to continue fighting, thereby saving the lives of 
soldiers on both sides of the conflict.  If the germ being spread had no long term side-effects, 
like the flu, then spreading this virus may in fact be permissible within the confines of jus in 
bello as per the principle of proportionality.  The germ would have to be delivered so as to affect 
only military combatants, in order to satisfy the principle of discrimination, but imagining that 
this requirement were met, there is nothing about the use of all germs as weapons that seems to 
blatantly contradict either discrimination or proportionality in theory.57      
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 An example of a virus that causes short term effects but is not lethal in adults is 
Venezuelan equine encephalitis (VEE).  VEE is well known in tropical climes where it is carried 
by host mosquitoes who then infect humans.  A microbiologist working on the US military’s bio-
defence program at Detrick army base in Maryland described the virus’ effects after an 
accidental outbreak caused fifteen members of his crew to fall ill: “it’s not lethal...it just makes 
you want to die.  Your eyes want to pop out of your head.”58  Seeing as the virus is only fatal in 
less than 1 percent of the adult population its use against combatants (whom we will assume for 
these purposes are all adults, given the commonly accepted injunction against child soldiers 
despite their prevalence in some 20th century wars) it is relatively innocuous and has no known 
long-term effects to speak of.  If the military goal in question were to temporarily incapacitate 
the enemy so as to be able to end the war quickly and with fewer deaths than a full frontal 
assault a consequentialist reckoning would surely judge the use of this virus as a weapon to be 
permitted.  Moreover, the legal conventions banning the use of certain excessively injurious 
weapons do not seem to directly apply to these non-lethal weapons.  As such, is there any 
empirical evidence that would lead to the banning of biological weapons?  Brian Orend, in line 
with the 1972 treaty banning biological weapons development, argues that there are independent  
reasons to prohibit the development and use of these kinds of weapons.  Orend objects to 
biological weapons (and other weapons like land mines) on the grounds that “they are more than 
likely than not to have serious spillover effects on civilians, and thus run afoul of 
discrimination.”59    
 The reason why biological weapons cannot be used, even against combatants, is that we 
have no way of controlling the effects of a germ agent once it is released.  The fear that these 
microbial agents would negatively affect innocent civilians and potentially people in 
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neighbouring nations, or the whole world motivated the adoption of the 1972 treaty.  For this 
reason, the 1972 treaty banning the development of germ weapons was explicit in stating that:    
Each state party to this Convention undertakes never in any circumstances to develop, 
produce, stockpile or otherwise acquire or retain: (1) Microbial or other biological 
agents, or toxins whatever their origin or method of production, of types and in 
quantities that have no justification for prophylactic, protective or other peaceful 
purposes :(2) Weapons, equipment or means of delivery designed to use such agents or 
toxins for hostile purposes or in armed conflict." Those emphasized words set out the 
general purpose criterion that the treaty uses to define its scope: the device whereby 
peaceful applications of pathogens (for example in vaccine production) are not 
obstructed by the BWC.60
However, there are those who believe that the treaty was too vague in its definition of what is 
permitted within the sphere of defence.  As Miller, Engelberg and Broad explain:
The treaty was maddeningly vague, and [US] government lawyers had spent years 
trying to translate its provisions into practical rules.  Government experts agreed that the 
pact allowed a broad range of experiments with germs and toxins, as long as the aim 
was defensive and the quantities of agents small.  Studies of weapons were more 
problematic...The government’s legal experts had never formally wrestled with whether 
a country could buy, steal, or manufacture a germ bomb and use it to establish standards 
for testing vaccines or other defences.  Some experts believed such experiments were 
acceptable, as long as they were not intended for war.  Other government officials 
contended that a weapon was, by definition, meant to inflict harm and was therefore out 
of bounds, even for defensive studies.  A bomb was a bomb was a bomb, they would 
say.61
For the same reasons we examined with respect to non-lethal weapons in the preceding section, 
any weapon that will, whether intentionally or unintentionally cause civilians to be targeted and 
treated as though they were combatants is condemned as unjust by the principle of 
discrimination.  Moreover, the statutes of existing international regulations go farther than 
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condemning the use of biological weapons, they also condemn any stockpiling of these 
weapons; far more than what is required of nuclear weapons, which are not directly banned by 
any piece of legislation.  In many ways biological weapons are far more threatening than nuclear 
weapons because they are easier to acquire, and the results of their use are so difficult to predict 
with any accuracy.  Moreover, holding a state or an individual responsible for unleashing a 
biological agent is extremely difficult when the outbreak follows the same pattern as a normal 
epidemic.    With the threat of being caught minimized germs are a likely weapon of choice for 
untraditional combatants like terrorists and guerrilla fighters, who lack the funds and support 
necessary to carry out traditional wars.  These facts in combination are disheartening to say the 
least and this threat is “magnified by a unique feature of germ weapons-uncertainty.”  This is not 
the case with all the other weapons we have examined up to now.  For example, “explosive 
bombs leave few doubts about their toll.  But in a biological attack, city officials would not 
immediately know the source and nature of the outbreak or the true number of victims.”62  This 
makes germ warfare more likely and difficult to control.  Of all the weapons we have looked at 
they have the potential to drastically change the nature of warfare in the 21st century.  As such, 
any theory of just war will have to come to grips with this potential expansion of the meaning of 
war.
8.  New Weapons and the Same Just War Theory
 In the last section we have looked at some modern technologies that have made their 
appearance in the latter half of the past century.  If we consider the history of just war theory and 
these new developments together it seems clear that the principles of discrimination and 
proportionality limit what kinds of weapons are allowable in warfare.  This, of course, is not a 
statement in favour of less advanced methods of killing.  As we have seen technology can have 
some good effects on both the duration and lethality of warfare and these technologies should be 
developed in line with the general spirit of just war theory.  However, the arguments against 
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certain uses of weapons that are either not discriminate or proportionate enough does not end 
here.  In order to truly pass judgment on these new weapons they must be considered in light of 
recent changes to just war theory, as well as the geopolitical realities of the 21st century.  In the 
sections that follow we will confront these new weapons with Michael Walzer’s “supreme 
emergency condition”, which augments the measures that can be taken against certain types of 
enemies and in certain situations of war.  Next, we will determine whether the emergence of 
guerrilla warfare and terrorism as threats to the global world order justify different responses 
than were typically allowed when just war theory developed in light of more traditional wars 
between states.     
Part III: Adaptations of Just War Theory
9.  Walzer and McMahan on Discrimination
In the preceding section the judgements that were made regarding the permissibility of 
certain classes of weapons were based on the principles of discrimination and proportionality.  If 
certain classes of weapons are to be judged impermissible it is because they cannot meet the 
basic requirements of jus in bello.  Moreover, there may be certain technologies that we should 
aim to develop because they are better at achieving the goals of discrimination and 
proportionality.  That is of course, if these principles are taken as absolute as they are in the 
traditional outlining of just war theory that has been presented.  However, not all theorists of just 
war agree as to the nature of the principles of jus in bello and the changes brought to these 
conceptions may have an effect on the way weapon prohibitions are viewed.  
The first variation of jus in bello that will be taken into consideration is Jeff McMahan’s 
subsuming of jus in bello to jus ad bellum.  If McMahan is correct then the principles of 
discrimination and proportionality do not apply equally to all combatants.  Adopting this version 
of just war theory would no doubt make it easier to justify a ban on indiscriminate weapons.  
However, what will be argued is that his adaptation of just war theory places the burden of the 
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responsibility for aggression at the wrong place and that McMahan unintentionally commits 
himself to pacifism.  If the traditional distinction between jus in bello and jus ad bellum 
maintains, as most theorists assume, then there are still those who, agreeing with Walzer, claim 
that there are moments in which the principles of discrimination and proportionality must be put 
aside for practical reasons.  This adaptation of just war theory poses a direct threat to weapons 
prohibition attempts as it justifies certain indiscriminate attacks on civilians.  If these attacks are 
sometimes justifiable, then arguing for a prohibition of the weapons capable of these kinds of 
attacks is not desirable.  The following section will argue against Walzer’s adaptation of just war 
theory that would allow for the putting aside of the principles of discrimination and 
proportionality in order to argue against his position on weapons prohibitions.    
9.1 McMahan’s integration of jus ad bellum and jus in bello  
     
In his essay “The Ethics of Killing in War”, Jeff McMahan argues against the traditional 
theory of just war by claiming that the separation of jus ad bellum and jus in bello cannot be 
justified.  What this means is that once you have determined who is acting on the side of justice 
through the principles of jus as bellum, these judgments carry over into the sphere of jus in 
bello, allowing the just war theorist to make moral judgments that take these judgments into 
account.  In doing so, he challenges the idea that discrimination means only distinguishing 
between combatants and non-combatants.  McMahan argues for an even more inclusive 
principle of discrimination.  One that distinguishes combatants fighting on the side of justice 
from those he calls “unjust combatants”.  What this means for just war theory, more practically 
speaking, is that if country x attacks country y, then y has the right to defend itself against its 
attackers and the soldiers doing this defending cannot be held morally accountable for their 
actions, so long as they respect the principles of jus in bello: proportionality and discrimination.  
The initial attackers, however, are not in the same moral position.  The initial attack was unjust 
and so each subsequent use of force is not defensible.  The soldiers who do not have justice on 
their side, the “unjust combatants”, are committing murder when they attack, irrespective of who 
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they are aiming their weapons at, be they combatants or non-combatants.63  While this position 
has gained in popularity with just war theorists there are some problems with this 
characterization.  
First, Walzer has argued, quite convincingly, that the “moral equality of soldiers” means 
that soldiers, no matter which side of the struggle they are on, are not held morally responsible 
in the same way that murders are.  Because soldiers are coerced into their situations and are in a 
position where necessity reigns, they cannot be said to be acting completely autonomously.  As 
Walzer says war is “a social practice in which force is used by and against men as loyal or 
constrained members of states and not as individuals who choose their own enterprises and 
activities...the soldiers would almost certainly be non-participants if they could.”64  What this 
means is that in separating jus ad bellum from jus in bello you are holding the right people 
accountable for the actions they have freely chosen.  The political leaders are responsible for 
deciding to engage in battle and they are charged with war crimes when they act aggressively in 
violation of the principles of jus ad bellum.  Soldiers and even more likely, generals and 
commanding officers, are held responsible when breaches to the rules of jus in bello are made.  
The soldiers themselves are not held responsible merely because they went to war, they are 
judged on the individual actions that they actually had a chance to control in some way.
McMahan points out the fact that “a single war can have numerous aims, either serially, 
simultaneously, or both” and that “some of these may be just while others are unjust.”65  Based 
on this conception of just cause as potentially transient, he then goes on to argue that “this 
understanding of just cause tends to erode the traditional theory’s distinction between jus ad 
bellum and jus in bello.  For on this understanding, the requirement of just cause applies not just 
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to the resort to war, or to the war as a whole, but also to individual acts of war.”66  But if it is the 
individual acts of war that are being judged, then it must be that the individual combatants 
carrying out these actions must be the ones who are ultimately held responsible.  However, 
given that soldiers are often coerced, whether they are professionals or draftees, holding them 
responsible for the global workings of political systems seems to be placing the blame for the 
war at the wrong place.  This, of course, does not mean that individual acts of war cannot be 
judged unjust, traditional just war theory has always made these kinds of judgements by 
referring to the rules of engagement as they are laid out in jus in bello.  It is also true that 
soldiers sometimes can and do make judgements as to a war’s justice and refuse to participate in 
wars that they consider to be unjust.  But this ability depends on a number of factors including 
the basic foundations of the society in which the soldier is living.  For example, a draftee living 
in a totalitarian society would have no choice as to whether or not to go to war and even in the 
most liberal democracies soldiers are placed in situations that significantly limit their ability to 
make decisions autonomously.  
A good example of this is the vaccination of soldiers against anthrax; in 1998 the US 
army started vaccinating its troops against anthrax after a long battle to have the vaccine 
approved by the FDA.  But the problems did not end when the vaccine was approved.  By 1999 
several hundred soldiers had refused to accept the vaccine and a lawsuit to defend the soldiers 
had begun.  Despite the fact that this was a small percentage compared those who had accepted 
the vaccine the cases were high-profile enough to bring attention to the matter.  The military 
tried to court-martial those who disobeyed the orders given them.  Although this example does 
not bear on a refusal to fight it reveals the fact that soldiers are often coerced into obeying 
commands that they would otherwise have potential reasons to resist.  It also reveals the fact that 
a relatively small percentage of people are willing to fight against authority when the time 
comes to do so, as well as, the fact that those who are willing to do so are usually higher up the 
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chain of command to begin with.67  If we apply these findings to a situation of actual fighting 
the orders coming in on the ground would be least likely to be contested by those actually 
carrying them out.  To insist that soldiers bear the brunt of the responsibility for crimes in war 
would be to relegate entire classes of people to the category of criminals when they do not 
necessarily bear any direct responsibility for the actions they engage in; an unintuitive result for 
just war theory.  We will come back to other cases where the defence of civil liberties will come 
into conflict with just war theory when we consider the treatment of terrorists and guerrilla 
fighters under just war theory in part 4.  For now we will continue to examine McMahan’s 
proposed revision of just war theory.   
No doubt, McMahan’s proposition has the aim of limiting how wars can be fought and 
justified, and is therefore in line with the general aim of just war theory.  However, it seems that 
judging individual acts of war as just or unjust based on the terms of jus ad bellum simply 
complicates matters to the point of making nearly every act of war unjust in some sense.  The 
problem with this position is not that it is theoretically impossible; rather, the problem is that 
McMahan claims to occupy a different position in the spectrum than the one he is defending.  In 
other words, if McMahan is right that individual acts of war should be judged based on the 
criteria of jus ad bellum, then he seems to have committed himself to a type of pacifism, which 
he claims to be opposed to.  McMahan considers himself to be a just war theorist and not a 
pacifist and says quite clearly that “there must, unless pacifism is true, be legitimate targets for 
just combatants.”68  Following Benjabi it seems likely that McMahan has unintentionally 
committed himself to a kind of pacifism while claiming to argue for a new version of just war 
theory.
Why is this the case?  Let us imagine what war would look like if McMahan’s criteria 
were put in place by applying his conception of just war theory to an abstract illustration.  If a 
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country a attacks another country b for aggressive and expansionist reasons then there is no 
contest as to which side is on the side of justice and which side is not.  Jus as bellum clearly 
prohibits using war for aggression and country b is then granted the right to protect its 
sovereignty and citizens from the aggressive attackers of country a.  In this case country b can 
use any means of repelling a that are necessary so long as these are not in violation of the 
principles of jus in bello.  According to McMahan the soldiers of country, being engaged in a 
war of aggression, a would only have the right to attack the soldiers of country b if the latter did 
something to violate jus in bello, such as attack its civilian population.  This polarization of the 
soldiers on opposing sides is counterintuitive.  Even if the initial attackers wanted to stop 
fighting they would be facing an army of counter-attacking soldiers, making stopping very risky 
indeed.  Moreover, if the attackers suddenly came to the realization that they were not justified 
in their attack this would mean that there were soldiers willing to carry out an initially unjust 
attack on another country but who would then realize that the war they were fighting in was 
unjust and refuse to continue once the soldiers on the side of justice started repelling the attack.  
This is an unlikely situation because the same soldiers who were willing to start the fighting are 
also those who would have the burden of recognizing that the war they are engaged in is unjust 
and stopping the fighting.  In traditional just war theory this problem does not arise because the 
soldiers are not the ones making the decision to go to war or to continue the war.  No matter 
what side they are fighting on they are not ultimately responsible for the war and its duration.  
Let us imagine for argument’s sake that the soldiers of country a are aware that by fighting they 
will be engaging in a war of aggression and refuse to fight in the war.  Whether or not they 
would be held personally responsible the moralist would expect this result in such a clear cut 
example with the absence of coercion.  If this were the case then war would not be a possibility 
as the soldiers on the side of justice would have no one to fight against.   
Now, if coercion were in place, as it usually is, and the soldiers themselves were 
unaware of the nature of the war thinking that they were on the side of justice, then they would 
not abstain from engaging in their aggressive actions not believing that they would be held 
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responsible.  In this case we would have a war where both sides believe that they are on the side 
of justice and the individual acts of war get carried out with only the principles of jus in bello 
having an effect on the nature of the fighting.  In other words, we are back at square one, where 
the soldiers on both sides are equal as far as justice is concerned.  The third and final possibility 
arises when soldiers fighting on one side are aware of the fact that they are fighting in, what 
others at least, consider an unjust war and continue fighting nonetheless in the absence of 
coercion.  Although an unlikely scenario, we would not expect these soldiers to be particularly 
concerned with the laws of war and just war theory more generally if they would be willing to 
totally ignore the basic principles of just war theory.  For example, in a case where the 
combatants were aware that they were fighting in a war of aggression we would not expect them 
to be concerned with fighting proportionally or discriminately to begin with.  Given the three 
possibilities, that the soldiers not on the side of justice are being coerced, that both sides believe 
that they have justice on their side, and that the unjust combatants are willingly fighting in an 
unjust war, only in the last scenario would we want to hold the unjust combatants responsible, 
but not necessarily for their breaches of jus ad bellum, but for their disregard for the rules in 
general, specifically the rules of jus in bello.  Had McMahan’s integration of jus ad bellum and 
jus in bello been desirable then the principles of jus in bello would have only applied to the 
combatants on the side of justice, seeing as the “unjust” combatants would have been judged 
responsible for crimes whether they attended to the principles of jus in bello or not.  No doubt 
they would have been judged more harshly for violating these principles in addition to the 
fundamental jus ad bellum principles, but these subsequent violations would have been of less 
importance than the initial agreement to take part.  I this case what sort of incentive would 
combatants have to respect the rules of jus in bello if by doing so they are accepting greater risks 
for themselves when they will be judged responsible either way.
If the unlikely situation arose in which only those on the side of justice fought to re-
establish peace the consequences would be great for just war theory.  Those on the side of justice 
are likely to be concerned with discrimination and proportionality and would not want to harm 
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enemy civilians as this would go against the goal of re-stabilizing the political order.  However, 
given the arguments against the likelihood and applicability of this theoretical position we are 
still left in a position where combatants have an equal moral standing in jus in bello.  Next we 
will examine Walzer’s supreme emergency condition which also introduces an inequality 
between combatants on either side of a struggle in order to temporarily relieve those on the side 
of justice from the requirement of obeying the rules of jus in bello.  
9.2 Examining Walzer’s Supreme Emergency Condition
Given that McMahan’s proposed of fusing the requirements of jus ad bellum and jus in 
bello seems to yield unintuitive results it appears that the traditional separation of the two 
spheres is desirable.  As such, in maintaining the place of the principles of jus in bello intact 
there remains the possibility that these principles could be put aside given the right 
circumstances.  Walzer maintains the traditional separation of these two spheres of just war 
theory for all situations that conform to what he considers “normal” warfare.  But there are 
situations that he considers so extreme that the rules of jus in bello need to be put aside in favour 
of ridding the world of some evil that “is unusual and horrifying”69.  Walzer’s paradigmatic 
example of a case where the decision to forgo the principles of discrimination and 
proportionality was justified is the situation of the British facing the Nazi’s in WWII.  According 
to Walzer, the Nazi’s posed a threat to the British that was so great as to compromise the very 
nature of civilization as we know it.  In other words, allowing the Nazi’s to win the war was 
something that no moral person would accept, so any measures necessary to making sure that 
this outcome did not present itself were justifiable.  As Walzer puts it: 
Nazism was an ultimate threat to everything decent in our lives, an ideology and a 
practice of domination so murderous, so degrading even to those who might survive, 
that the consequences of its final victory were literally beyond calculation, 
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immeasurably awful.  We see it-and I don’t use the phrase lightly-as evil objectified in 
the world, and in a form so potent and apparent that there could never have been 
anything to do but fight against it.70       
This argument depends on the idea that any justification that would normally go into 
determining if an action is legitimate or not is no longer taken into consideration.  It requires us 
to give up on any rights based approach to morality but more importantly it requires putting 
aside consequentialist calculation.  Discrimination and proportionality together represent both 
types of moral reckoning: a rights based approach with discrimination, irrespective of the 
consequences you must respect the rights of citizens to not be attacked, and a consequential 
approach with proportionality, use only the necessary amount of force to reach your goals.  What 
the supreme emergency allows for, according to the model put forward by Walzer, is the putting 
aside of discrimination and proportionality in that order.  First and foremost, you are morally 
justified in attacking civilians for the sake of terrorising the population and seeing as the 
objective is to spread fear, which is an intangible attribute of people and not a tangible military 
objective, no proportional calculations can come into play in this situation.  This reading of 
Walzer goes against some of his commentators who see him as putting aside the rights based 
approach to morality and substituting it for a consequentialist one.  However, if we want to take 
Walzer’s supreme emergency condition as he puts it I believe we have to see it as a putting aside 
of all morality.  As he puts it, in a situation of supreme emergency “I accept the burdens of 
criminality here and now.”71  
 In order to understand how and when Walzer believes the supreme emergency condition 
comes into play we must examine his paradigmatic example more closely.  Walzer is well aware 
of the fact that making an argument like the one in favour of the supreme emergency condition 
is dangerous and as he puts it, “a great deal is at stake here, both for the men and women who 
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adopt such measures and for their victims, so we must attend carefully to the implicit argument 
of ‘supreme emergency.’”72  When Churchill described Britain’s situation in 1939 as a “supreme 
emergency” Walzer takes this to mean that he was making an implicit argument as to both the 
imminence and the nature of the danger that she was facing.  The argument takes the following 
form: “if we don’t do x (bomb cities), they will do y (win the war, establish tyrannical rule, 
slaughter their opponents).”73  But all fighting in war time (except for the final action that finally 
ends the war) takes this form, if we do x, they will do y, so the conditions that allowed Britain to 
attack German citizens must have had some particular moral standing.  What must these 
conditions be?  Walzer says that what was so horrible about the situation facing Britain was that 
the Nazis would 1. Win the war, 2. Establish tyrannical rule, and 3. Slaughter their opponents.  
Walzer must mean these three conditions taken together are what make the prospect of not 
bombing German cities inconceivable.  Why must all three conditions obtain?  According to just 
war theory the very fact that the aggressor nation will win the war does not justify forgoing the 
rules of engagement.  If this were the case then whoever had justice on his or her side could 
always ignore the rules of jus in bello in order to win the war more quickly and with less risk to 
himself.  Even McMahan, who thinks that those on the side of justice have special rights 
compared to the aggressors, does not think that the rules of jus in bello can be put aside by just 
combatants.  On the contrary, those on the side of justice have a disproportionate moral 
responsibility compared to the aggressors.         
 The second condition requires that the aggressor nation impose tyrannical rule upon 
those conquered.  This is clearly a very bad consequence indeed that we would naturally want to 
avoid, even at a very great cost.  However, the only problem with this condition is that it is hard 
to imagine an aggressor nation that does not intend to impose a form or another of tyrannical 
rule on those it has taken over.  In other words, it is natural that those just conquered will not 
submit willingly to a ruler who has just taken over by force after waging war with that aggressor. 
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It is natural to expect that the aggressor will enforce his rule by force in order to maintain 
control, at least for the beginning of his rule.  Walzer is clear that there is a difference between a 
war whose goal is the seizure of territory compared with the annihilation of a portion of the 
population for ideological reasons.  In the case of mere territorial expansion no appeal to the 
supreme emergency condition obtains.  In these cases the problem is not with the way of 
governing once the war is over.  The real problem with the aggressor nation winning the war 
comes if condition three is met.  If the aggressor nation wins the war, imposes tyrannical rule 
and the tyrannical rule takes the form of slaughtering all opposition, then the conditions become 
such that we cannot stand to live with the consequences of this takeover and must avoid it at all 
costs, even if this means going against the rules of jus in bello pre-emptively.  
 It is the slaughter of all opposition that is so horrifying that it requires us to act so as to 
avoid this murderous carrying out its plans of mass murder.  In the case of the Nazi regime its 
record of conquest was such that we can be sure that had the Nazi’s been allowed to win the war 
against the British in 1939 they would have continued on the path of murder that had been set up 
long before the war even began.  This fact in and of itself does not seem to justify the resort to 
the actual tactics employed by the British in 1939 or at any point after.  The tactic of carpet 
bombing German cities did nothing to address the problem of the mass murders being 
perpetrated by the Nazis and nothing, meanwhile, was done to combat these evils.74  If there is a 
justification for the actual program of aerial bombardment then it must be justified by the 
intended effects of this campaign.  
9.3 Justifying Aerial Bombardment: Retribution and Necessity
 When the British adopted the decision to bomb German cities in 1939 a terrifying 
precedent was set for the future of battles waged in World War Two and beyond.  As Walzer 
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reports, “as a direct result of the adoption of a policy of terror bombing by the leaders of Britain, 
some 300,000 Germans, most of them civilians, were killed and another 780,000 seriously 
injured.”75  The precedent is terrifying not because of the number of lives lost and people injured 
but because of the policy that was adopted to kill civilians indiscriminately with the direct aim 
of terrorising the population into submission.  The people killed in the raids were not victims of 
collateral damage, they were the targets.  One potential way of justifying these indiscriminate 
attacks is through the use of the principle of retribution.  The Germans had previously attacked 
London in the same indiscriminate manner, and the only way to avoid a continued assault on 
British cities was to do the same to the Germans. The idea being that if the Germans had to 
suffer the same fate as the British, they would relinquish their use of this method.  However, this 
justification fails on two counts, first because this is an unlikely solution to the problem; 
retaliation usually leads to escalation not retreat.  And second, because even if this were an 
effective solution retribution is not a viable moral option.  If Germany bombing London was 
morally reprehensible, then Britain bombing Germany’s cities is equally reprehensible; it does 
nothing to right the moral wrong that was committed in the first place; this action simply creates 
more suffering.  As Stephen A. Garrett maintains, “Britain was fighting to maintain values of 
respect for dignity and integrity of each single individual but adopted a method of war so 
destructive as to threaten the very cause for which she was fighting.”76 
 The second argument for the bombing of German cities makes direct use of the idea of 
necessity.  Walzer puts the argument in the following way:
Given the view of Nazism that I am assuming, the issue takes this form: should I wager 
this determinate crime (the killing of innocent people) against that immeasurable evil (a 
Nazi triumph)?  Obviously, if there is some other way of avoiding the evil or even a 
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reasonable chance of another way, I must wager differently or elsewhere.  But I can 
never hope to be sure; a wager is not an experiment.  Even if I wager and win, it is still 
possible that I was wrong, that my crime was unnecessary to victory.  But I can argue 
that I studied the case as closely as I was able, took the best advice I could find, sought 
out available alternatives.  And if all this is true, and my perception of evil and imminent 
danger not hysterical or self-serving, then surely I must wager.77
Making an argument of this type is very dangerous for just war theory because it superimposes 
two levels of necessity on top of one another.  War is always a last resort undertaken only in 
situations of necessity, but this necessity is still in conformity with the rules of engagement.  The 
supreme emergency comes and brings a second level of necessity into play, one in which we can 
forego the rules of engagement.  The problem here lies in the fact that there is no clear-cut way 
to tell which situation we are facing in a time of war.  The second type of necessity is simply 
allowed because of a matter of degree, the threat is more imminent, more horrifying, but every 
war has its horrifying and tense moments; the risk with the supreme emergency condition is that 
it provides a whole range of excuses to those who would go against the principles of jus in bello 
for their own personal gain.  Walzer is clearly aware of this danger as he states in Arguing About 
War that: “a state of supreme emergency may be morally convenient for leaders who wish to 
dispense with prohibitions and taboos” and also that “we are morally bound to work against the 
persistence [of the supreme emergency], to look for a way out, lest we be thought to view our 
dirty hands with less abhorrence.”78  Orend argues that Walzer’s supreme emergency condition 
goes against his justification of a state’s legitimacy in going to war in the first place.  A state’s 
right to go to war stems from the individual’s right to self defence, yet in personal morality we 
do not think it morally possible to sacrifice a third party in order to save yourself.79  Walzer does 
not make any convincing argument as to why this element of personal morality should not 
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translate into the public sphere.  So Walzer opens just war theory up to the possibility of the 
supreme emergency, all the while being aware of the potential abuses this allowance may lead 
to.  This is not to say that we do not feel bad for those who are faced with particularly difficult 
situations and then justify their otherwise immoral actions by making a plea from necessity.  As 
Christopher Toner following Aristotle puts it: “we do not concur with those who are 
overwhelmed by evil, but pity them.  To be sure, we should not be quick to condemn those who 
have given in to such a temptation.  But not to condemn is far from condoning: appeal to 
‘necessity’ cannot grant moral justification, but only a plea for leniency.”80        
Toner may be right but an appeal to necessity in just war theory is necessary if we are to 
distinguish just war theorists from pacifists.  Without an appeal to necessity just war theory 
could never get off the ground as every resort to war is a resort that is made based on the idea of 
necessity.  However, as was argued above, the risks associated with going to war in the first 
place are ones that we can live with as political communities due to the fact that the rules of jus 
in bello are in place to protect us from the worst consequences of war.  The superimposition of 
the second level of necessity on the first is a step we should not be willing to take if the 
prohibition against the indiscriminate killing of the innocent is to be maintained in morality.  If 
Walzer were only committed to not condemning the indiscriminate actions of those faced with a 
supreme emergency we could come to terms with the effects of this allowance.  However, 
Walzer’s addition of the supreme emergency condition to just war theory is much more than that 
and what is worse; it is particularly frightening when is combined with his stance on weapons 
prohibition.
9.4 Supreme Emergency and Prohibited Weapons
As we have seen, Walzer’s stance on weapons is that they should be judged according to 
how they are used and not based on the nature of the weapon itself.  As he says discussing 
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nuclear deterrence, “the crucial distinction in the theory and practice of war was not between 
prohibited and acceptable weapons but between prohibited and acceptable targets.”81  The only 
exception to this rule that he would potentially accept is a ban on nuclear weapons, although he 
presents arguments that could defend the use of nuclear weapons on a limited scale.82  Given 
that this reality was impossible at the time of his writing he concludes that “nuclear weapons are 
politically and militarily unusable only because and insofar as we can plausibly threaten to use 
them in some ultimate way.”83    This stance is perplexing because there is no reason to accept a 
ban on nuclear weapons while refusing to allow a ban on other weapons, such as chemical and 
biological weapons, that are also indiscriminate and can have equally damaging results.  
Walzer’s position is only tenable given that the supreme emergency condition exists, for the 
following reason.  If a supreme emergency can compromise the continued existence of my 
society, or my ally’s society, and the only way to stop this from happening is through the use of 
indiscriminate means, then maintaining a stockpile of weapons capable of responding to this 
type of crisis is justifiable.  I would maintain, even if these weapons are nuclear weapons, which 
is an undesirable result for Walzer.  It is interesting to note that the American Society of 
International Law based its decision to not ban nuclear weapons on the possibility of requiring 
these weapons in a situation of extreme emergency.  The Society stated that:
The threat or use of nuclear weapons would generally be contrary to the rules of 
international law applicable in armed conflict, and in particular the principles and rules 
of humanitarian law, but that in view of the current state of international law and the 
facts before the Court, it could not conclude definitively whether the threat or use of 
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nuclear weapons woud be lawful or unlawful in an extreme circumstance of self-
defence, in which the very survival of a state would be at stake.84 
However, if there is no situation that would justify the use of indiscriminate means of waging 
war, then what justification could there be for developing and stockpiling these weapons.  As a 
test of our intuitions regarding the supreme emergency condition, Daniel Statman asks us to 
imagine the following hypothetical situation:
Let us assume that the “Manhattan Project,” which started as a response to the German 
atomic program, had been completed a year or so earlier than it actually was.  That’s not 
a wild assumption.  Let’s further assume that had the United States dropped two or three 
atomic bombs (of the sort later used against Japan) on Berlin, that would have ended the 
war immediately.  None of Hitler’s shelters in Berlin or around it could have protected 
him from the effects of these bombs.  Finally, had the war come to its end this way, with 
a German defeat in 1944, the lives of millions would have been spared, including close 
to a million Hungarian Jews who were murdered in 1944-45 and all the Allied casualties 
incurred in the invasion and in the last phases of the war.85  
If the Supreme emergency is to be taken seriously, then it is hard to see how Walzer can argue 
against the use of the atomic bomb in this hypothetical situation.  What is so much worse about 
using the atomic bomb in this situation compared to the bombs that were actually dropped on 
Germany?  “It is estimated that more than 500,000 German civilians lost their lives to Allied 
bombing.  Perhaps another million received serious injury.  Around 3 million homes were 
destroyed.”86  If Walzer is against not the idea of nuclear weapons but the results of their being 
used, how can he seriously maintain that the use of another weapon to get the same results is 
justifiable, while using an atomic weapon is not?       
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If the supreme emergency is not viable, then maintaining or developing indiscriminate 
weapons is not justifiable as they could never be used in the context of a just war.  Given the 
above arguments against the supreme emergency condition it seems that we must give up the 
traditional claim that weapons be judged only as they are used and not based on their 
characteristics.  Why is this the case?  This is the case because weapons are not benign in their 
effects on which wars are fought and how they are fought.  The weapons available for use 
change the nature of which wars we are willing to fight.  As Hugh White states, “Western 
countries now have options to achieve military objectives at far less risk and cost to themselves. 
This has been a major factor in encouraging them to resort to armed force more often, for less 
reason.”87
In the following section we will look at how the supreme emergency condition has been 
used to justify certain wars against untraditional combatants (notably terrorists and guerrilla 
warriors) and the civilian populations that get caught in the line of fire.  If these situations are be 
described in terms of the supreme emergency condition and this condition justifies attacks on 
civilian populations the combination of this factor with the new technologies described in part 2 
could have disastrous effects on the lives of those who intentionally, or not, harbour 
untraditional combatants.                      
      
Part IV: Unconventional Combatants, New Weapons and the Supreme 
Emergency
10. Old and New Wars 
As we have ascertained up to this point the principles of jus in bello depend on the 
distinction between combatants and non-combatants.  Without this categorical distinction 
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between groups just war theory does not even get off the ground.  However, just war theory has 
traditionally been thought of as pertaining to inter-state conflicts and the occasional civil war 
wherein the opposing sides in whatever conflict is in question are legitimate military targets.  In 
other words, whether the soldiers fighting are volunteers, paid professionals or draftees they 
fight on behalf of a distinguishable social group.  They fight on behalf of the group whose 
interests they are representing and can be distinguished from this group by a number of factors 
including uniforms and other means of identification.  However, as Eric Patterson outlines in his 
paper “Just War in the 21st Century: Reconceptualising Just War Theory after September 11” 
new wars differ from traditional wars in a number of ways.  1. The scope of the battlefield has 
changed, 2. Old wars were fought by legitimate political entities, 3. Old wars were fought by 
combatants and those not distinguishing themselves as such were criminals subject to capital 
punishment, 4. Old wars were fought away from civilian centers, and 5. New weapons are 
capable, not only of reaching farther and killing more efficiently, they also have (sometimes 
unintended) consequences on the natural and economic environments they touch.88  Given all 
these changes to the conditions of warfare (which have been extensively covered in parts 1 and 
2), we are required to accept certain amendments to traditional just war theory that allow non-
traditional fighters to protect their interests when they are threatened and that also allow states to 
target enemies who refuse to distinguish themselves from whatever group they claim to be 
acting on behalf of.  Patterson makes the distinction that has been taken for granted up to this 
point explicit saying that discrimination is different from non-combatant immunity in that, 
“discrimination simply means making a choice about who constitutes an active threat as 
distinguished from those who do not.”89
While this distinction between non-combatant immunity and discrimination may seem 
obvious, it raises several questions regarding how far we are willing to push the idea of 
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discrimination.  Given that the traditional distinction between combatant and non-combatant is 
no longer tenable, which of the so-called “active military” threats are we willing to target and 
with which kinds of weapons?  Is it true, as Patterson claims, that “the Sunni girl carrying 
munitions to insurgents is a threat, whereas the Pashtun male protesting against the government 
is not”?90  And if this is the distinction that we wish to maintain, what underlying principle 
justifies this distinction?  Our answers to these questions will have a profound impact on just 
war theory as they can potentially strip the principle of discrimination of most or all of its 
weight.
10.1 Guerrilla Warriors
Guerrilla fighters occupy a special place in just war theory as they often rely on tactics 
that go against traditional rules of engagement, such as wearing distinguishing uniforms or 
identification.  However, guerrillas do not necessarily go against the more fundamental rules of 
discrimination and proportionality, and thus they can be regarded as just combatants.  In cases 
where the only form of resistance available is guerrilla tactics we do not judge those who would 
otherwise be taken over harshly.  Despite the fact that guerrillas do not distinguish themselves 
from civilians they, nonetheless, as Walzer stresses, “stress the moral quality not only of the 
goals they seek but also of the means they employ.”91  They are embroiled in the language of 
just war and use it to justify their actions.  The guerrilla fighter, like the traditional soldier in 
uniform, must have some claim to legitimacy beyond the fact that he respects the principles of 
discrimination and proportionality.  Like the traditional soldier, he must derive his legitimacy 
from the fact that he actually represents the population on whose behalf he is fighting.  As 
Walzer emphasises: “Guerrilla war is ‘people’s war,’ a special form of levée en masse, 
authorized from below”, which means that the guerrilla “is not a solitary fighter hiding among 
the people” but a member of a nation at war because they do not have an army capable of 
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defending them.92  If a nation is allowed to defend itself against attack by sending in its army, 
then surely a nation invaded but without an army capable of resisting the attack and defending 
its people is allowed to resist in any way available.              
This way of characterising guerrilla warriors implies that these fighters are always 
fighting with just cause and that this is the feature that grants them their legitimacy.  However, 
this need not be the case.  We can easily imagine cases in which a group of citizens take up arms 
against a minority within or outside their borders and that the subsequent attack upon them by an 
allied nation’s army is just.  The guerrillas in this imagined scenario would be the aggressors 
with the traditional army defending.  The critical attribute of guerrilla warriors that grants them 
their status as legitimate warriors is the fact that they act as traditional armies do, their aims are 
limited politically in that they have set goals that can be achieved through military engagement, 
whether these aims are just or not.  Given the nature of international politics and the fact that not  
all nations are capable of the same kinds of defence, granting the rights of soldiers to guerrilla 
warriors is desirable, even if granting these fighters means taking more risks from the point of 
view of the traditional soldiers.  When we make judgments as to the morality of these groups of 
people we have to look at what they actually do in fighting as individuals.  If they are respecting 
the rules, then how can they be judged immoral?  To be sure, fighting a war against an enemy 
who is harder to pin down makes the job of the traditional soldier more difficult, but this is not a 
condition that alters the nature of warfare.  There are still identifiable fighters and civilians who 
do not pose a threat to the opposition.  Because the guerrilla is not posing a threat to the 
traditional distinctions of just war theory he can easily be assimilated into the most important 
principles of jus in bello: proportionality and discrimination. The identities of the guerrillas and 
their political goals are what separate them from other untraditional combatants like terrorists.  
Terrorism is a much greater threat to just war theory as it completely alters the nature of wars 
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and how they are fought.  We will now turn to examining terrorism and its implications for just 
war theory.93
10.2 Terrorism
Terrorism is such a loaded term since the start of “the war on terror” began after the 
attacks on the World Trade Center in 2001 that it is now impossible to make reference to 
terrorism without implying lone Muslim extremists bombing city busses and metro stations.  
However, terrorism was not invented on September 11, 2001, nor is it used only by individuals 
for religious/ideological reasons.  Defined broadly, terrorism is any action taken with the aim of 
inspiring fear in an adversary.  Taken as such, it does not matter who is responsible for the 
action, an army, a band of guerrillas, or an individual who belongs to a network of other 
likeminded people operating across international borders.  Orend defines terrorism as “the use of 
random violence-especially killing force-against civilians with the intent of spreading fear 
throughout the population, hoping that this fear will advance a political objective.94  Thus, the 
British air strikes on Dresden in WWII, Pinochet’s overthrow of the Chilean government on 
September 11, 1973,95 as well as more recent bombings, such as the attacks of September 11, 
2001 all fit the mould of terrorism.  Obviously the principle of discrimination prevents the use of 
terrorism as a legitimate military activity, so long as the supreme emergency condition is not a 
moral possibility.  The use of terrorism as a tactic of democratic states is only likely to be 
permitted if the people tolerate its use.  In other words, any arguments put forward condoning 
the use of terrorist measures, such as those for the supreme emergency condition, make it that 
much harder to get a majority of people in a democratic society to militate against it.  
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Even if just war theory and international law expressly condemned terrorist activities 
there are still problems that terrorism brings about for just war theory.  Since terrorism is so 
effective a strategy, and so cost effective, it is likely to remain a principle strategy for those 
unable (either for economic or ideological reasons) to wage traditional wars.  Given the reality 
of this situation, any just war theorist must grapple with defending against and engaging in 
counter attacks against terrorists.  Terrorism is a tactic; however, it appears to make a difference 
who is employing the tactic, not from the standpoint of the morality of the action itself, but from 
the standpoint of reactions to these tactics.  Defending against an attack, be it terrorist or other 
by a recognizable entity, such as a military or guerrilla group is obviously not as difficult as 
attacking an enemy who ceases to exist as soon as the attack is over.  When a terrorist tactic is 
employed in the context of an already ongoing war those responsible for the attacks must take 
responsibility for their actions.  In a sense there is no “war on terror”, as “terrorists” do not 
behave like any other warring faction.  They do not have determinate political goals that can 
ever be said to have been met.  The so called “war on terror” is not like any traditional war 
because there is no determinate beginning and end to the fighting.  If this “war” is granted the 
status of a traditional war, then it is not at all obvious how to outline the principles of 
proportionality and discrimination so that the rules of engagement make sense ethically.
Discrimination is already difficult to apply in situations against any untraditional 
combatants because they tend to disappear as soon as a particular raid or operation has taken 
place, disguised either by the natural landscape or the civilian populations who support them.  In 
the case of “terrorists” who operate across international borders locating these “suspects” is 
notoriously difficult and the people being targeted do not fit easily into our working definition of 
combatant.  According to convention a combatant is someone who poses a direct threat to the 
opposition.  A person who has bad intentions or feelings towards another group of people and 
who may even be planning to attack said group still doesn’t fit the definition of combatant.  On 
Orend’s definition: civilians, “whatever their internal attitude, are not in any external sense 
dangerous people.  So they may not be made the direct and intentional objects of military 
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attack.”96  The “terrorists” who are the objects of attack in the “war on terror” go about their 
daily lives as normal civilians do.  They are not “demonstrably engaged in military supply or 
military activity” and are, therefore, “immune from direct attack.”97  The “terrorist” resembles a 
criminal who can be charged with a crime.  His crime may be one directed against another 
country but judicial procedures exist that can deal with these kinds of crimes.  If he is a criminal 
who conspires to commit horrible crimes, then ostensibly there is evidence that could be used 
against him in a court of law.  The placing of “terrorists” into the same category as combatants 
strips them of their right to due process and other legal rights protected by other principles in 
areas unrelated to war.  
While the ongoing wars in Afghanistan and Iraq that are part of “the war on terror” can 
be easily fit into traditional just war theory because these nations harbour people responsible for 
attacks on the United States (a claim which is not uncontroversial) other actions taken by the US 
in this war are not so easily defensible.  Some of the ongoing tactics employed include: “the 
targeting, followed by the seizure or even killing of persons outside the zones of armed conflict 
in Afghanistan and Iraq whom the US government suspects of terrorist activity.”98  In other 
words, the US government has been performing what have come to be known as “extraordinary 
rendition” and “targeted killing”.  Whether these tactics are morally justifiable depends on 
whether we view terrorists as combatants in a war or as criminals in peacetime.  As Ratner puts 
it, we can view the attacks of September 11, 2001 through two different lenses; the first being 
the lens of law enforcement and the second being the lens of armed conflict.  If September 11, 
2001 can be seen through the lens of law enforcement, then:
The hijackings and crashes were criminal acts-under US law, foreign law and 
international criminal law.  This perspective also suggests that the response to them 
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should be undertaken through law enforcement processes.  These techniques involve 
traditional methods of police and judicial cooperation among countries at peace-
extradition, sharing of intelligence, cooperation on prosecution, and diplomacy, 
including the employment of carrots and sticks to gain the cooperation of recalcitrant 
states.  The goals of such processes are prevention and punishment, and these techniques 
are often focused on building a case for a criminal trial.
On the other hand if the lens of armed conflict is employed,
The September 11 events constituted an armed attack on the United States, albeit one by 
non-state actors.  As a result, the United States with the aid of its allies is entitled, under 
article 51 of the UN charter, to engage in self-defense against those actors (and perhaps 
some states as well).  The current situation is an armed conflict with Al Qaeda, one not 
necessarily confined to the territory of Afghanistan.  The United States is thus permitted 
to deploy a full array of military capabilities against terrorist targets; it can capture and 
kill terrorists without having to rely upon law enforcement techniques of arrest and 
prosecution.99 
If terrorists are viewed under the lens of armed conflict this opens up the possibility of secretive, 
and unending war, which is obviously an unappealing result for a just war theory whose goal it 
is to limit the duration and negative effects of said wars.
 What kind of evidence is there to suggest which lens terrorist attacks should fall under?  
If the scale and threat of terrorism in its most recent form is indeed grave enough, then states 
may well be justified in their resort to war to counter it.  If, however, it can be shown that 
judicial process is adequate in countering terrorism, then this is the strategy that should be 
adopted for both moral and practical reasons.  This is the position that will be argued for, 
following Paul Robinson’s argument put forward in his article “The Ethics of the Strong against 
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the Tactics of the Weak”.  What Robinson argues, in his own words, is that “the military gain of 
action against terrorists is often outweighed by the harm to the political strategy.”100  Why is this 
the case?  Firstly, Robinson notes, there have been numerous cases that suggest that police 
forces worldwide have been very successful in combating terrorist threats.  To cite only one 
example, the British government successfully employed counter-terrorist measures against the 
Northern Irish terrorists in the 1970’s.  They observed the laws regarding legal evidence required 
for arrest and conviction of suspects within the normal standards of legal evidence.  While these 
same suspects might have been treated as combatants and attacked with military force and 
without any attention to due process.  This obviously makes a big difference in a society 
committed to principles of legality.  Working within the confines of the laws set up with the 
protection of the citizens in mind legitimizes the actions of the British in this case.  If the state 
were legitimized in casting aside the procedures and laws of due process whenever so called 
“terrorists” acted, the trust and stability in the government would be put into question; quite a 
consequence for the seizure of a small group of people.  This is political and practical evidence.  
However, we also have moral reasons to favour policing.  
In just war theory much debate has surrounded the reasons underlying the acceptability 
of targeting combatants.  Why is it not considered murder when a soldier is killed.  The typical 
reasoning behind this view (adopted by anyone but the pacifist) is that the soldier relinquishes 
his right to not be attacked by personally posing a threat to the opposition.  The soldier does 
something to lose his right even if he is coerced into his position.  Therefore, depending on the 
identity of the terrorist he will have a different status; that of combatant or civilian.  As Kretzmer 
puts it, “if members of terrorist groups are regarded as ‘unlawful combatants’, they may be 
targeted at any time, as if they were combatants; if as civilians, only when actually involved in 
carrying out a terrorist attack.”101  Some may argue that the terrorist has, like the traditional 
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soldier, been trained to kill and is prepared to kill those on the opposition, so he is open to 
military attack.  However, a further constraint on the right to kill soldiers legitimately rests on 
their actual status at the time of their attack, so that even if we regard the terrorist as a combatant  
based on this criterion we may still object to him being attacked under certain circumstances.  
According to Walzer, in order for a soldier to be attacked justly he must be metaphorically 
“dressed” as a soldier.  In other words, he must be engaging in the task of posing a threat to the 
opposition.  In traditional wars, Walzer notes several cases in which soldiers were unwilling to 
fire on so called “easy targets”.  The reluctance to shoot at a soldier who is unaware he is under 
attack rests on the fact that the “naked” soldier does not pose a direct threat to those who have 
the power to take his life away.  In an amusing passage Walzer quotes a passage from George 
Orwell’s military diary, which states that:
At this moment a man, presumably carrying a message to an officer, jumped out of the 
trench and ran along the top of the parapet in full view.  He was half-dressed and was 
holding up his trousers with both hands as he ran.  I refrained from shooting at him.  It is 
true that I am a poor shot and unlikely to hit a running man at a hundred yards ... Still, I 
did not shoot partly because of that detail about the trousers.  I had come here to shoot at 
“Fascists;” but a man who is holding up his trousers isn’t a “Fascist,” he is visibly a 
fellow-creature, similar to yourself, and you don’t feel like shooting at him.102
The man with his trousers half on in Orwell’s example does not fit into the category of 
combatant, someone who can legitimately be aimed at, suggesting that the suspected terrorist 
who is at home, or working at his civilian job, cannot be a target either.  No wonder we are 
relying more and more heavily on unmanned drones to carry out targeted killings in the “war on 
terror.”  If a human soldier were sent to do the job it is a question whether he would be able to 
carry out his mission. 
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 Even in cases, like the wars in Afghanistan and Iraq, where the military is openly 
deployed it has been noted that taking direct action against terrorists simply increases support 
for the group in question.  Robinson cites a report by senior army officials in Iraq who stated 
that:
The task force concluded that erosion of enemy influence thought direct action...only led 
to one confirmable conclusion-you ultimately pushed those on the fence into the 
insurgent category ... Kinetic operations would provide the definable short-term wins we 
are comfortable with as an Army, but, ultimately, would be our undoing.103    
This suggests that military operation is not the ideal way of countering terrorism.  Not only is it 
not ideal it is also morally problematic as the externalities of this type of campaign are very 
difficult to justify given the nature of the threats that the military and society at large are facing.
11. Justifying the “War on Terror” using the Supreme Emergency
Although our fascination with “terrorism” as a concept has only peaked since September 
11, 2001, there is evidence that suggests that the actual incidence of terrorist attacks has been on 
the decline in the world since the 1980’s, when they were at their height.104  This is not the 
picture that those supporting the “war on terror” would promote.  Although 9/11 was the most 
lethal terrorist attack on US soil in the history of the country’s existence it was by no means an 
attack that threatened the very existence of the country, nor was it uniquely threatening (the 
Oklahoma City Bombing comes to mind).  The possibility that the “war on terror” is a supreme 
emergency must be taken into consideration as this seems to be the type of justification for the 
targeting of civilians that is open to use by those who support the “war”.  Hopefully at this point 
the arguments against the supreme emergency condition presented subsequently are still 
sounding convincing.  However, for the purpose of this section we will take for granted that the 
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theoretical arguments against the supreme emergency condition were not put forward in order to 
show that in the present political climate there are real practical reasons for arguing against the 
supreme emergency.  If the current tactics being employed in the “war on terror” are only 
justifiable in the case that it constitutes a supreme emergency, then the arguments against 
targeting the terrorists when they are in their civilian roles disappears.  
Taking the position that Walzer proposes, that the supreme emergency condition is 
necessary in certain cases, but that it must be used with extreme caution, we will look at whether 
the “war on terror” can constitute a supreme emergency based on Walzer’s criteria.  Although 
Walzer has gone on record saying that: “it is our self-interest to deny that it can ever be justified 
to kill you and me and people like us--and, since most people are like us, it’s in everyone’s self-
interest to deny that terrorism can ever be justified.”105  This is not a particularly strong stance to 
take against the deliberate killing of civilians.  The fact that it is not in our self-interest as a 
global community to engage in terrorism does not suggest a universal a-historical condemnation 
of terrorism; it suggests only a limited refusal to condone such tactics when the consequences of 
going against the general rule.  In the case of Nazi Germany, Walzer clearly thinks that engaging 
in terrorism is justifiable because of the nature of the threat that Germany posed to the rest of 
civilization as we know it.  Does the 21st century’s “war on terror” constitute such an exception 
to the rule?  Based on what our politicians have been saying and authorizing in the name of this 
war it should correspond to a very grave threat indeed.  The response to September 11, 2001 has 
been “the largest scale use of force by any state since the Persian Gulf war over a decade 
ago.”106  With our liberal politicians and thinkers claiming that the “war on terror” will require 
“lesser evils” and “dirty hands”107 we can clearly distinguish our society’s debt to Walzer, who 
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has repeatedly argued for tactics that go against our common morality in particularly trying 
times.
Walzer himself does not apply the supreme emergency condition to the “war on terror” 
but he does condone the use of real and not only metaphoric war in order to combat terrorism in 
certain cases.  Walzer says that in the case of the various forms of terrorism “we should oppose 
them all, but the different engagements will have to be considered one by one.  We should 
imagine the “war” as including many possible engagements.  “War” is a metaphor here, but real 
war is a necessary part of the metaphorical “war.”108  And as such the principles of just war 
theory must apply in these cases where war is the only way of countering terrorism.  Walzer is 
quick to caution using war to counter terrorism as our new technologies have the ability to 
replicate terrorism abroad.  When trying to counter terrorism he says that we should not rely too 
heavily on new technologies that alleviate the risks associated with mounting the attacks.  If not 
we risk killing innocent civilians in order to save the lives of other innocent civilians.  Walzer is 
clear that:
In fighting against terrorists, we must not aim at innocent people (that’s what the 
terrorists do); ideally we should get close enough to the enemy, or to his supporters, so 
that we are quite sure not only that we are aiming at them but also that we are hitting 
them.  When we fight from far away, with planes and missiles, we have to get people in, 
on the ground, to select the targets, or we have to have very good intelligence; we must 
avoid overestimating the smartness of our bombs.109  
 But what would Walzer say is justifiable if the terrorist threat were to become so important as to 
constitute a threat to a civilization or humanity as a whole?  Is there any way that the “war on 
terror” could conceivably justify the supreme emergency exemption allowing for the wholesale 
slaughter of civilians in order to squelch terrorism?  It is likely that Walzer would be 
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sympathetic to the claim that the supreme emergency condition could obtain in any situation of 
war although he has been quick to caution its use and has not called any conflict other than 
Britain’s situation in WWII at a specific interval a supreme emergency.  Nevertheless, we must 
take this possibility into consideration if we are to consider the full range of possibilities open to 
defenders of the “war.”  What would happen if the terrorists got nuclear arms and threatened to 
drop them on New York or LA?  What civil liberties and doctrines of international law would we 
be willing to sacrifice in order to stop the attacks from occurring?  The answers to these 
questions are very difficult, even when taken from the standpoint of a seemingly universal moral 
doctrine, such as just war theory.  That is not to say that just war theory cannot make 
pronouncements based on these difficult situations.  To claim in the face of these problems that 
our moral understanding cannot take them into account or that our traditional accounts have 
failed, or even worse that all moral theories are relativistic and historicized would be to miss the 
point of just war theory entirely.
 That is not to say that just war theory cannot and should not change in any way, we may 
very well have to argue for amendments to the secondary principles that inform our moral 
decisions.  However, our moral convictions that have been shown to stand the test of time, those 
principles that have endured over a thousand years of debate and examination have likely 
endured for good reason.  We should be wary of what Margolis cautions is “one of the most 
stubborn political dangers of our time: namely the advocacy, against all opposing factions, of an 
exclusively right way to understand moral/political norms and values in universalist terms”110 
but we should be equally wary of those who would justify their particular strategy in the face of 
long standing principles.  Some compromise between the two strategies in moral theory building 
must be obtained if we hope to have just war theory remain influential in the 21st century.  What 
has been recommended throughout this paper is the continued use of the basic principles of jus 
in bellum; namely discrimination and proportionality, while we may very well have to modify 
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some existing rules concerning bans on weapons in order to maintain a hold on the fundamental 
goal of just war theory.  In other words, in order to limit the destructiveness of war we may have 
to ban certain weapons, including their stockpiling and development, when previous versions of 
just war theory merely banned their use in certain situation.   
Conclusion         
 In response to the title of this paper, does just war theory need to get with the times?, the 
answer that has been argued for is at once yes and no.  No, first because the principles that were 
developed to limit the destructiveness of war were developed with an appreciation for the fact 
that technologies and political climates change.  The basic principles remain useful no matter 
what period of time we are seeking to describe.  However, previous generations of theorists 
could not foresee the changes that were going to happen with regards to weapons technologies, 
as such they did not think it important to prohibit certain ways of killing, how could it matter 
how you were going to die if the final result was always the same.  These authors could not 
conceive of weapons capable of altering not only the state of the individual soldier being 
attacked but the physical environment surrounding the soldier for hundreds or even thousands of 
square kilometres.  Therefore, we have to be aware of these facts and recognize that evaluating 
which weapons are permitted will have a profound effect on which wars and what kinds of wars 
get fought.  This is the approach taken in international law, as was mentioned, but this is also the 
approach in civil society.  It has been recognized that allowing certain types of weapons in civil 
society is dangerous and that there should be limits to what kinds of weapons are permitted.  For 
example, automatic weapons are not legal for purchase by regular civilians in Canada.  Just war 
theorists should not remain silent on these issues but should be actively pushing for those 
weapons that are capable of meeting the requirements of discrimination and proportionality.  
This discussion will have an impact on all areas of just war theory.
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The focus of this paper throughout has been on the effects of technology on different 
aspects of jus in bello because this is the area of just war theory that is most directly affected by 
these types of changes.  However, just war theory is a united theory that comprises three areas 
that have been separated theoretically for the purposes of analysis, when in reality it is not 
always so easy to make the divisions cleanly.  Despite the critiques that were addressed against 
McMahan’s attempt to join jus in bello to jus ad bellum it is obviously true that the different 
areas of just war theory are not able to stand alone.  In order to have a coherent just war theory 
all three areas have to be taken into consideration.  Given more space one interesting way of 
expanding this project would be to look at the effects technology and new ways of fighting have 
had on which wars have been fought (which was only briefly touched upon) as well as the 
effects on the promise of lasting peace.  How we choose to fight in the present clearly has a 
effect on how fighting ends and what kinds of positions communities on the ground are left in 
for years after the fighting is over.  All kinds of problems relating to reconstruction and what is 
owed to devastated communities could be reduced or augmented depending on the types of 
weapons that are used in a war effort.  Given that only jus in bello was addressed directly, these 
and other interesting topics were left out of the discussion including the essential point regarding 
the root causes of current struggles.  It is likely that these too have changed over time given the 
changed international climate.  This topic intersects with work that is currently underway in 
other areas of political philosophy, specifically in the politics of identity.111  Hopefully these 
topics will be addressed in the future.  
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